igneum/docs/analysis/class-v6/coexistence-model.md

The coexistence model (second cut): can a specialised supplier earn a normal return while GPUs stay close enough to compete?

8 October 2026, 16:1x to 17:0x UK, branch class-v6-floor-sram, floor lane 3, Igneum 2.0 D4 (the research lane's word of 17:0x UK; the founder's accepted external review replaces the capex wall with this model; the profitability surface of docs/analysis/class-v6/floor/sram-and-floor.md section 4.4 is its base). Second cut; the section list is the D4 checklist so the pin can be closed line by line. Every row is modelled: the arithmetic is scratchpad/coexist.py (the first cut, run on build-3 at 16:2x) and scratchpad/coexist2.py (this cut, run on build-4 at 16:52; build-3 was down from 16:40); the card rows are lane 4's class v5 table (docs/analysis/class-v6/floor/denominator.md, section 10.4 of the design document: measured at the floor where it says so, modelled knees elsewhere), the chip rows the chip model's (chip-model-v3 5.5 and 5.12, lane B, the k lane's 3.2 pJ per forced op), the proving rows the bench table's shard times with the fleet lane's measured day on Devnet 3 (the 12 GB tier a measured zero for internal proving), the prices street approximations. The operator simulation beside it is docs/analysis/class-v6/operator-simulation.md. Nothing here is served; nothing is a measurement of a chip. The founder is not named.

The statement under test. Success: a specialised supplier earns a normal return and GPUs stay close enough in total cost, obtainable and useful outside mining, that entrants still compete. Failure: a supplier operating privately at much lower cost exhausts competitors' margins. The pass line, verbatim: the model names credible conditions for sustained commodity participation and names where it fails; a result needing a small network, token appreciation or scheduled ASIC death has not passed. The development cost is SUNK in the mandatory case (the opponent covers manufacturing, deployment and operation only); the paid-development cases sit beside it.

0. The result in one page

**Amended 17:4x UK on the coordinator's pin (17:38): the model's die ticket is the adversary lane's complete-machine figure, USD 2.94 per MH/s (power, cooling, board, the node it must run, yield and packaging), under the plan's evidence standard (complete-board overhead, same-node and advanced-node results kept separate); lane B's USD 0.6 silicon-plus-board row stays as the silicon floor, a lower bound and not a machine. Amended again 17:2x UK on the adversary lane's reconciliation (its section 15 at d3ad1549): the USD 2.94 figure was a 300 W machine (the die throttled to 383 MH/s by its shadow core); the maker raises the power budget until the power train and the core's silicon bind, and the reconciled unit ticket is USD 1.0 per MH/s (0.5 to 1.6) at 1 to 1.5 kW, the joules unchanged. At the reconciled ticket the die fails (a), (b), (c) and (f) and passes only (d), (e) and (g) (section 12c, the headline); the 12b pass of (a) and (b) was the 300 W artefact. The served form: "a sunk USD 10 M die fleet holds 42 percent of a growing chain and 62 percent of a flat one on landing (27 to 93 across the reconciled bounds) and takes every flat or shrinking chain by year 3 to 5; its success statement does not hold at any reconciled ticket, and what holds the die is the project economics (NRE of USD 50 to 250 per MH/s against USD 1 of unit cost)". Items 1 and 6 below are the first cut's reading at the USD 0.6 silicon floor, which the reconciled ticket lands near; section 12c is the headline and 12b the superseded 300 W row.

1. The DRAM-board chip (a GPU's memory system with a programmable core) passes the success statement on today's rows; the N2 SRAM die fails it once it exists with its development sunk AT THE SILICON FLOOR (USD 0.6 per MH/s; at the pinned machine ticket of USD 2.94 it takes the hybrid's verdict, section 12b). With development sunk, a 3-year life and power at USD 0.06 per kWh, the board's cost per accepted MH/s-hour is 307 micro-USD against the best GPU owner's 156 to 204 at the same electricity and 415 to 588 for a new entrant (0.5x to 0.7x the owner, 1.4x to 1.9x the entrant); the die's is 72 (2.2x to 2.8x the owner, 5.8x to 8.2x the entrant; at the GPU's 0.12, 3.6x to 4.6x and 7.2x to 9.9x). In the five-year runs with a per-class supply curve the board at a sunk USD 10 M holds 4.5 to 24 percent of the chain at a 24 to 69 percent margin with 6 to 16 of 17 GPU classes above water in every path; a USD 10 M die fleet holds 50 to 70 percent on landing and takes the chain by year 3 to 5 on flat and shrinking paths (0 of 17 classes above water); a USD 100 M die fleet takes it on landing in every path and runs at a loss.
2. The tariff advantage is explicit and separate from the hardware advantage (section 1). The review's 6.25x illustration (a 1.5x chip at 0.06 against a GPU at 0.25) is the first row; on the measured rows the operating advantage is the joule ratio times the tariff ratio (2.2x to 4.5x times 1x to 4.2x for the board, 3.7x to 7.8x for the die), the hardware advantage 1.3x to 4x for the board and 9x to 29x for the die, and the total a third to a half of the operating figure because power is 60 to 70 percent of an owner's cost and 30 to 40 of an entrant's.
3. The break-even electricity price is tabled for all 17 classes (section 3). A GPU owner with sunk hardware matches the board at 3 years up to 9 to 15 cents per kWh on Blackwell and 4 to 6 on Ada and Ampere; at 1 year up to 27 to 40 cents; it matches the die at 0 to 5 cents. No GPU ENTRANT matches the board at 3 years or the die at any life at any positive price except the 5070 Ti against the 1-year board (25 cents): the entrant rows are where the GPU side loses first.
4. Proving is the second income the chip does not have (section 5). A 16 GB or larger card earns USD 3 to 7 a day from internal proving at IGN 0.10 (the H100 16, the A100 9) against USD 0.2 to 1.7 a day from mining at the GPU equilibrium, and USD 5 to 12 under a proving spike; the SRAM die, the DRAM board, the 9070 XT and the Mac earn nothing from it, and the 12 GB tier earns nothing from internal proving today (measured). A GPU displaced from mining by a chip goes to proving (the operator simulation's D1: 1,500 of 9,177 cards), which is the mechanism that keeps commodity participation when the mining margin is gone.
5. Accessible supply and dependence (section 11). At the GPU equilibrium the chain's hash is 5.6 / 9.6 / 20 / 42 TH/s at IGN 0.03 / 0.10 / 0.30 / 1.00, which is 12 / 21 / 44 / 95 percent of the installed base available to mining (44.7 TH/s, approximate) across 16 NVIDIA classes, AMD and Apple; the same hash is 17 / 29 / 60 / 128 N2 wafers from one supplier, or 34,000 to 255,000 DRAM boards. Dependence on a single supplier is total for the die, partial for the board, nil for the GPU side.
6. The conditions under which the success statement holds (section 12), each with its number: (a) the chip's all-in cost within about 1.5x of the best GPU owner's at the GPU's electricity; (b) the chip's hardware per MH/s not under about a quarter of the GPU entrant's; (c) a fleet above a third of the chain costing more than a year's miner revenue; (d) GPUs keeping a resale market and a use outside mining; (e) the per-joule gap at the honest knee under about 3x; (f) the supplier's margin a normal return that does not rise with the halvings; (g) a second income (proving) for the commodity side that the specialised supplier's hash engine cannot earn (amended 19:5x UK on review B's F09(g): its owner can buy into it with companion GPUs at the GPU entrant's cost, so what remains to the commodity side is the sunk card's hardware term on the proving income, section 5a). The board passes six of seven at a 1 to 3 year life (it fails (c), as every chip does: corrected 19:5x UK on F09(c), the first cut's cell contradicted its own inequality); the die fails (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) at every life, price path and electricity price once it exists at the silicon floor, and (a), (b), (c), (f) at the reconciled ticket (12c). Against the pass line: the board's pass does not need a small network (it holds at 42 TH/s and IGN 1.00), token appreciation (it holds on the flat and shrinking paths) or scheduled ASIC death (its life axis is 1 to 5 years and the 180-day rotation is not what holds it); the die's failure is not cured by any of the three either, and the only condition that holds the die is that nobody pays to build it (the surface: IGN 0.73 for a USD 150 M project at a third of the chain over three years), which is an investor's decision, not a level the chain stays below. The model names where it fails: a sunk SRAM die of USD 10 M or more at any price in the window.

1. The tariff advantage beside the hardware advantage (D4: the electricity axis explicit)

The chip at 0.06 per kWh with farm hosting; the GPU at 0.06, 0.12 and 0.25. "Operating" is joules times tariff; "hardware" the GPU entrant's annualised hardware over the chip's; the total against the existing owner and the entrant.

Row	Joules ratio	GPU tariff over chip tariff	Operating advantage	Hardware advantage	Total vs owner / entrant	Label
The review's illustration: a 1.5x chip at 0.06 against a GPU at 0.25	1.5x	4.17x	6.25x	n/a	n/a	the review
GDDR7 board, 3 y, vs 5070 Ti at 0.06 / 0.12 / 0.25	2.2x	1x / 2x / 4.2x	2.2x / 4.3x / 9.0x	1.3x	0.5x / 1.4x; 0.9x / 1.7x; 1.6x / 2.4x	modelled
GDDR7 board, 3 y, vs 5080	2.6x	the same	2.6x / 5.2x / 10.9x	1.9x	0.7x / 1.9x; 1.1x / 2.3x; 2.0x / 3.2x	modelled
GDDR7 board, 3 y, vs 4090	4.5x		4.5x / 9.1x / 18.9x	4.0x	1.2x / 3.8x; 1.9x / 4.6x; 3.5x / 6.2x	modelled
N2 SRAM die, 3 y, vs 5070 Ti	3.7x		3.7x / 7.4x / 15.4x	9.3x	2.2x / 5.8x; 3.6x / 7.2x; 6.8x / 10.4x	modelled
N2 SRAM die, 3 y, vs 5080	4.5x		4.5x / 9.0x / 18.7x	13.8x	2.8x / 8.2x; 4.6x / 9.9x; 8.5x / 13.8x	modelled
N2 SRAM die, 3 y, vs 4090	7.8x		7.8x / 15.6x / 32.4x	28.7x	5.0x / 16.4x; 8.1x / 19.5x; 14.8x / 26.2x	modelled

Reading: the tariff multiplies the operating advantage one for one, as the review says, and the total is a third to a half of it; the board's total against a Blackwell card at its knee is under 1x (owner) to 2.4x (entrant) across the whole axis at 3 years, the coexistence band; the die's 2.2x to 14x is not.

2. Cheap and dear electricity: the GPU population's cost per accepted unit (D4: cheap and dear electricity)

Cost per accepted MH/s-hour (micro-USD; accepted = 97 percent of raw: rejects 0.5, downtime 2.0, epoch preparation and propagation 0.5; pool fee 1 percent). The existing owner (hardware sunk; power, 5 percent wear, fees) and the new entrant (buys new or used, runs two years, resells at the table's fraction).

Card	Owner at 0.06 / 0.12 / 0.25	Entrant, new, at 0.06 / 0.12 / 0.25	Entrant, used	Hardware share of the entrant at 0.12	Wh per MH/s-hour	Alternative use (rental yield, approximate)	Label
RTX 5090	243 / 388 / 704	661 / 807 / 1,122	800 / 945 / 1,261	64 percent	2.33	USD 0.3 to 0.5 an hour, 3x to 5x its mining cost	measured floor
RTX 5080	204 / 332 / 611	588 / 716 / 995	650 / 779 / 1,058	64	2.06	USD 0.15 to 0.25 an hour	measured floor
RTX 5070 Ti	156 / 263 / 493	415 / 521 / 751	453 / 560 / 790	59	1.70	USD 0.1 to 0.2 an hour	modelled knee
RTX 5070	175 / 284 / 521	515 / 624 / 861	558 / 668 / 905	65	1.75		modelled knee
RTX 5060 Ti 16 GB	260 / 407 / 727	921 / 1,069 / 1,388	956 / 1,104 / 1,423	72	2.36		modelled knee
RTX 5060	225 / 364 / 663	734 / 872 / 1,171	768 / 906 / 1,205	68	2.21		modelled knee
RTX 4090	357 / 580 / 1,065	1,181 / 1,405 / 1,890	1,163 / 1,387 / 1,872	68	3.58	USD 0.3 to 0.4 an hour	modelled knee, stock measured
RTX 4080	312 / 531 / 1,006	1,011 / 1,231 / 1,706	879 / 1,099 / 1,574	64	3.51		modelled knee
RTX 4070	300 / 524 / 1,008	854 / 1,078 / 1,562	778 / 1,001 / 1,486	58	3.58		measured tune
RTX 4060 Ti 16 GB	336 / 574 / 1,090	1,159 / 1,397 / 1,913	969 / 1,207 / 1,723	66	3.81		modelled knee
RTX 3090 (used)	384 / 666 / 1,276	1,272 / 1,554 / 2,164	1,091 / 1,373 / 1,983	64	4.51		modelled cap
RTX 3080 (used)	310 / 573 / 1,141	754 / 1,016 / 1,585	661 / 923 / 1,492	48	4.20		modelled cap
RTX 3060 (used)	408 / 768 / 1,550	847 / 1,208 / 1,989	754 / 1,114 / 1,895	40	5.77		modelled cap
RX 9070 XT	657 / 1,151 / 2,220	1,617 / 2,111 / 3,180	1,668 / 2,162 / 3,231	53	7.90		measured
H100 (hosted)	1,313 / 1,438 / 1,709	8,374 / 8,499 / 8,770	7,880 / 8,004 / 8,275	97	2.00	USD 2 to 3 an hour: never mines	modelled lock
A100 (used)	775 / 955 / 1,346	6,615 / 6,796 / 7,187	4,388 / 4,568 / 4,960	95	2.89	USD 1 an hour: never mines	modelled
Apple M5 Max (reported, not headlined)	789 / 876 / 1,066	4,033 / 4,120 / 4,310	4,690 / 4,778 / 4,967	96	1.40	a workstation: an owner only	measured

The chip rows, development sunk (the mandatory case), farm hosting USD 0.02 per kWh-equivalent on top:

Chip	0.5 y at 0.06 / 0.12 / 0.25	1 y	2 y	3 y	5 y	Hardware / power at 0.06, 3 y	Label
GDDR7 board with an N5 core	1,414 / 1,463 / 1,570	750 / 799 / 906	418 / 467 / 574	307 / 356 / 463	219 / 268 / 375	239 / 65	modelled
HBM3 one stack with a core	2,123 / 2,164 / 2,252	1,104 / 1,145 / 1,233	594 / 635 / 723	425 / 465 / 553	289 / 329 / 417	367 / 54	modelled
N2 SRAM die with the core	226 / 255 / 317	134 / 163 / 225	87 / 116 / 178	72 / 101 / 163	60 / 88 / 151	33 / 38	modelled
N2 SRAM die at the bare-lane floor	202 / 212 / 235	109 / 120 / 142	63 / 73 / 96	47 / 58 / 80	35 / 45 / 68	33 / 14	modelled, the worst case

3. Break-even electricity prices for all 17 classes (D4: the output per class)

Cents per kWh at which the GPU's cost per accepted unit equals the chip's all-in at 0.06 per kWh; the OWNER figure (hardware sunk) and the ENTRANT figure (hardware bought); "under 0" means no positive price matches.

Class	GDDR7 board 1 y: owner / entrant	GDDR7 board 3 y	SRAM die 1 y	SRAM die 3 y
RTX 5090	27 / 10	9 / under 0	1.5 / under 0	under 0 / under 0
RTX 5080	32 / 14	11 / under 0	2.7 / under 0	under 0 / under 0
RTX 5070 Ti	40 / 25	15 / 0	4.7 / under 0	1.2 / under 0
RTX 5070	38 / 19	13 / under 0	3.8 / under 0	0.4 / under 0
RTX 5060 Ti 16 GB	26 / under 0	8 / under 0	0.9 / under 0	under 0 / under 0
RTX 5060	29 / 7	10 / under 0	2.0 / under 0	under 0 / under 0
RTX 4090	17 / under 0	5 / under 0	0 / under 0	under 0 / under 0
RTX 4080	18 / under 0	6 / under 0	1.1 / under 0	under 0 / under 0
RTX 4070	18 / 3	6 / under 0	1.5 / under 0	under 0 / under 0
RTX 4060 Ti 16 GB	16 / under 0	5 / under 0	0.9 / under 0	under 0 / under 0
RTX 3090 (used)	14 / under 0	4 / under 0	0.7 / under 0	under 0 / under 0
RTX 3080 (used)	16 / 6	6 / under 0	2.0 / under 0	0.5 / under 0
RTX 3060 (used)	12 / 4	4 / under 0	1.4 / under 0	0.4 / under 0
RX 9070 XT	7 / under 0	2 / under 0	under 0 / under 0	under 0 / under 0
H100 (hosted)	under 0 / under 0	under 0 / under 0	under 0 / under 0	under 0 / under 0
A100 (used)	5 / under 0	under 0 / under 0	under 0 / under 0	under 0 / under 0
Apple M5 Max	3 / under 0	under 0 / under 0	under 0 / under 0	under 0 / under 0

Reading: the board at 1 year is beaten by every Blackwell owner below 26 to 40 cents and by the 5070 Ti entrant below 25; at 3 years by Blackwell owners below 8 to 15 cents and by no entrant. The die is matched by no entrant and by owners only below 0 to 5 cents. The GPU side's electricity price is the board's whole variable and irrelevant to the die.

4. GPU replacement and resale on both sides, with the generation step on the chip side too (D4)

Who	Against the DRAM board (bought at twice the hardware term, the manufacturer's half)	Against the SRAM die (bought, the same)	What it means
A Blackwell owner at 0.06 to 0.12	never switches: the bought board at 3 years is 550 to 600 micro-USD against the owner's 156 to 332	switches at 0.12 (105 to 134 against 263 to 332); near indifferent at 0.06	the die replaces Blackwell owners at normal grid prices; the board never does
An Ada or Ampere owner at 0.12	near indifferent at 3 years (550 to 600 against 524 to 768); switches at 0.25	switches at every price	the board retires only the oldest cards at dear electricity, which the generation does anyway
A new entrant choosing between a new 5070 Ti and a bought chip at 0.12	the board at 3 years (about 600) is 1.15x the card's 521: the card wins; at 1 year the card wins 2x	the bought die (134) is 0.26x the card: the die wins 4x	an entrant market with a bought die has no GPU entrants; one with a bought board keeps them
The GPU generation at year 3 (1.5x per joule at the same price, the old card resold at the table's fraction)	cuts the entrant's cost 25 percent and the owner's power 33 percent: the board at 3 years then reads 1.5x to 1.7x the new entrant, in band	the die's advantage falls 25 to 33 percent, from 7x to 5x on the entrant: still out of band	the GPU side's own curve narrows the board's gap by the second generation and never closes the die's
The chip's generation at year 3 (a node step, 1.5x per joule, re-bought at the same silicon price)	the board's power term falls a third (65 to 43 micro-USD of 307): 2 percent of its cost; its hardware term is unchanged	the die's 38 to 25: 4 percent of 72	the chip side's generation moves the totals under 5 percent: the chip's cost is hardware, the GPU's is power, so the generation helps the GPU more
Resale	the GPU resells at 25 to 55 percent after two years (section 2); the chips at 0		the resale market is the GPU entrant's whole hedge and the chip has none, which is why the chip's life is the axis that moves everything (section 7)

5. Changing proving demand: proving revenue as a second income axis per class (D4: new)

The resolution's shape (the research lane, 17:0x UK): the tip stays whole to the miner; provers are paid the 20 percent pool per block plus an explicit user-funded proving fee with congestion pricing; the burn separate; the hard cap and no development tax kept. The internal pool at IGN 0.10 is USD 27,400 a day (0.2 x 0.77 B / 0.8 / 365), shared by proving capacity (a 5,000-card fleet drawn from the classes that can prove, approximate); external demand USD 2,000 a day at launch (spec 05's grid), 20,000 under a spike, 90 percent to the provers who deliver. The 12 GB tier's internal row is the fleet lane's measured zero (0 paid in 313 claims on Devnet 3, 8 October 2026).

Class	Memory	Shard s (bench)	Internal proving, USD per card-day	Plus external at launch	Plus external at a 10x spike	Mining at the GPU equilibrium, USD per card-day	Power per day at 0.12	Label
RTX 5090	32	6.3	7.42	7.90	12.29	1.69	0.86	modelled on measured shard times
RTX 5080	16	8.0	5.84	6.22	9.68	0.89	0.63	the same
RTX 5070 Ti	16	7.0	6.67	7.11	11.06	0.96	0.58	the same
RTX 5070	12	4.8	0 (measured zero)	0.64	6.40	0.51	0.40	measured zero, modelled external
RTX 5060 Ti 16 GB	16	11.6	4.03	4.29	6.68	0.24	0.26	modelled
RTX 5060	8	12.0	0 (measured zero)	0.26	2.56	0.21	0.23
RTX 4090	24	6.3	7.42	7.90	12.29	0.73	0.81
RTX 4080	16	7.5	6.23	6.64	10.33	0.56	0.63
RTX 4070	12	12.1	0 (measured zero)	0.25	2.54	0.39	0.32
RTX 4060 Ti 16 GB	16	11.6	4.03	4.29	6.68	0.22	0.22
RTX 3090 (used)	24	14.9	3.14	3.34	5.20	0.47	0.66
RTX 3080 (used)	10	7.1	0 (measured zero)	0.43	4.33	0.51	0.60
RTX 3060 (used)	12	14.4	0 (measured zero)	0.21	2.13	0.30	0.30
RX 9070 XT	16	none	cannot prove (no CUDA)			0.24	0.43
H100 (hosted)	80	3.0	15.57	16.60	25.81	1.13	1.01
A100 (used)	80	5.0	9.34	9.96	15.49	0.75	0.72
Apple M5 Max	36	none	cannot prove			0.34	0.11
The SRAM die, the DRAM board, any hash engine		none	0: a hash engine cannot prove	0	0	the whole chain's mining		by construction

Reading: at launch-shape demand a proving-capable card earns 4x to 8x more per day from internal proving than from mining at the GPU equilibrium, and the pool is shared by few enough cards that it pays even at 0.25 per kWh; under a spike the external fee adds 50 to 70 percent. The chip has none of it. At zero proving demand (the pool is a launch subsidy and the external market empty) the second income is 0 and the commodity side falls back to mining alone, which is the first cut's model; at the fleet lane's measured efficiency (5.5 percent of proving card-time paid on a day with a fault) the internal rows are 0.4 to 0.9 USD a day, still above mining for the 24 GB and datacentre classes. The condition this adds to section 12 is (g): a second income for the commodity side that the specialised supplier cannot enter; it holds while proving demand exists and the 16 GB and larger tiers can prove.

5a. Amendment, 19:5x UK (review B's F09(g)): the hybrid operator who owns companion GPUs or buys proofs

The first cut treated proving income as closed to the specialised supplier because its hash engine cannot prove. A company can own companion GPUs, or buy proofs; the single-device limitation does not exclude the operator. The test: for a hybrid operator (the chip for the hash, companion GPUs bought at MSRP for the proving), the proving surplus per card-day is the proving income less the companion card's entrant cost per day (hardware over two years with resale, plus power at 0.12 at the proving watts); for the sunk GPU owner it is the income less power alone. At IGN 0.10, the pool shared by a 5,000-card fleet, external demand USD 2,000 a day at launch and 20,000 at a spike (build-4, 19:54 UK; all modelled; the 12 GB tier's internal income the measured zero):

Class	Proving income per card-day, launch / spike	Companion card's hardware per day at MSRP	Power per day at 0.12	The hybrid operator's surplus, launch / spike	The sunk owner's surplus, launch / spike
RTX 5090	10.49 / 13.61	1.23	0.86	8.40 / 11.52	9.63 / 12.75
RTX 5080	8.26 / 10.72	0.68	0.63	6.95 / 9.40	7.63 / 10.09
RTX 5070 Ti	9.44 / 12.25	0.51	0.58	8.36 / 11.16	8.87 / 11.68
RTX 5070 (12 GB)	0.45 / 4.55	0.38	0.40	-0.32 / 3.77	0.05 / 4.15
RTX 4090	10.49 / 13.61	1.20	0.81	8.48 / 11.60	9.69 / 12.81
RTX 4080	8.81 / 11.43	0.82	0.63	7.36 / 9.98	8.18 / 10.80
RTX 4070 (12 GB)	0.18 / 1.80	0.45	0.32	-0.59 / 1.04	-0.14 / 1.49
RTX 3090 (used)	4.44 / 5.76	1.44	0.66	2.34 / 3.66	3.77 / 5.09
H100 (hosted)	22.04 / 28.59	17.11	1.01	3.92 / 10.47	21.03 / 27.58
A100 (used)	13.22 / 17.15	8.90	0.72	3.60 / 7.53	12.50 / 16.43

Reading: at launch-shape demand the proving income on a 16 GB or larger consumer card is 4x to 20x the companion card's own daily cost, so a hybrid operator buys companion GPUs and captures the proving income with a surplus within 10 to 15 percent of the sunk owner's (the hardware term, USD 0.5 to 1.4 a day on a consumer card); the datacentre parts are the exception (the hybrid keeps a fifth of the owner's surplus). Buying proofs instead of making them yields no income and is not a route to it. Condition (g) is therefore not an exclusive advantage of the commodity side: proving is a second market open to anyone who buys GPUs, which the chip's owner can and would; what remains to the commodity side is the sunk card's hardware term on that income (10 to 15 percent of the surplus on consumer cards), and the structural point that the proving fleet is GPUs whoever owns them. Condition (g) in section 12 is re-read accordingly: it holds for the GPU as a device (the proving fleet is GPUs) and not for the GPU owner as a business against a hybrid operator; it does not move any chip's verdict, since no chip passed (c) or (f) on it.

6. Private mining and hardware sales; cheaper derivative chips (D4)

From the surface (the floor file 4.4, the mission lane's shape), p* is the break-even price in USD per IGN:

Entrant	C_dev 20 M (a DRAM board), L 3 y, q 0.3 / 1.0	150 M (the SRAM die), 3 y, 0.3 / 1.0	Reading
The operator self-mining a first design	0.055 / 0.017 (USD 43 / 13 M a year of miner revenue)	0.73 / 0.22 (561 / 168 M)	the first entrant self-mines
The manufacturer selling hardware (keeps half the profit)	0.11 / 0.034	1.50 / 0.45	about 2x the operator's bar
The revision entrant (a second design at 0.3 x C_dev, T0 1 y)	0.019 / 0.006	0.12 / 0.04	a derivative costs a third and ships a year sooner; the sunk case bounds it
The shared-cost entrant (three share one design)	0.040 / 0.012	0.24 / 0.07
The hybrid (self-mine a year, then sell)	0.07	1.10	between the two
Development SUNK (the mandatory case)	0: the entrant pays manufacturing, deployment and operation only; its rows are section 2's chip rows	0	the whole threat is this case

With development paid, every chip is ABOVE the best GPU entrant (415 to 588 micro-USD) at IGN 0.10 and below; the die falls below it only from IGN 0.30 on a 3-year life; the board with paid development never does inside the window.

7. Several productive lifetimes (D4)

Life	GDDR7 board, sunk, at 0.06 (micro-USD)	Against the 5070 Ti owner / entrant	SRAM die, sunk	Against the 5070 Ti owner / entrant	Reading
0.5 y (the fixed-lane chip under the 180-day rotation)	1,414	0.1x / 0.3x	226	0.7x / 1.8x	neither chip pays at half a year; the board is 3x worse than a GPU entrant
1 y	750	0.2x / 0.6x	134	1.2x / 3.1x	the board loses to every Blackwell entrant; the die is in band against owners
2 y	418	0.4x / 1.0x	87	1.8x / 4.8x
3 y (the programmable chip's default)	307	0.5x / 1.4x	72	2.2x / 5.8x	the board's coexistence band; the die out of it
5 y	219	0.7x / 1.9x	60	2.6x / 6.9x

The rotation (layer 3) sets the fixed-lane chip's life at 0.5 years and does nothing to a programmable chip; its value is the factor between the first and the fourth row, not a wall, and the pass line's "scheduled ASIC death" is not what holds either chip here: the board holds at every life from 1 year on its hardware term, the die holds at none.

8. Growing and shrinking networks, reduced issuance (D4)

Five years with a per-class supply curve (section 9's rule), the emission halving in years 3 and 5, three price paths, a sunk chip fleet entering at the start of year 2. The chip's joules improve 1.5x at year 4 (a node step).

Path, fleet	Year 2	Year 3	Year 5	GPU classes above water (of 17)	Reading
Growing x2 from 0.10; a USD 1 M die fleet (1.3 TH/s)	6 percent of 20 TH/s; margin 92 percent	5 percent	3 percent of 39 TH/s	14, 15, 16	coexistence by dilution: the supplier earns 90 percent margins on a tiny share; not a normal return, but no class leaves
Growing; USD 10 M die (12.8 TH/s)	50 percent	43 percent	30 percent	12, 13, 15	half the chain on landing; dilutes to 30 percent by year 4 as GPUs re-enter at the higher price; margins 88 to 93 percent
Growing; USD 100 M die (128 TH/s)	100 percent; margin 49 percent	100 percent	99 percent	0, 0, 4	failure: one buyer holds the chain for five years; four classes return in year 4 at IGN 0.80
Growing; USD 10 M board (1.8 TH/s)	9 percent; margin 65 percent	7 percent	4.5 percent	14, 15, 16	coexistence at a 57 to 69 percent margin
Flat 0.10; USD 1 M die	9 percent	12 percent	19 percent of 6.9 TH/s	12, 11, 6	the halvings raise the share; six classes left by year 5
Flat; USD 10 M die	70 percent	89 percent	100 percent	6, 6, 0	failure by year 5
Flat; USD 100 M die	100 percent; margin -1 percent	-102 percent	-233 percent	0	failure for both: the fleet is larger than the revenue
Flat; USD 10 M board	14 percent; margin 57 percent	16 percent; 34	24 percent; 27	12, 11, 6	coexistence at a normal return (27 to 57 percent)
Shrinking x0.5 from 0.30; USD 1 M die	7 percent	17 percent	74 percent of 1.7 TH/s	13, 11, 2	failure in year 5 at USD 4 M of revenue
Shrinking; USD 10 M die	58 percent	96 percent	100 percent; margin -77 percent	11, 3, 0	failure from year 3
Shrinking; USD 10 M board	10 percent; margin 62 percent	22 percent; 28	91 percent; -30 percent	13, 8, 2	the board too takes a shrinking chain at USD 4 M of revenue, and loses money doing it

Reading: reduced issuance (the halvings) and a shrinking price move every row toward the chip's share, and a USD 1 M die fleet is 74 percent of a USD 4 M chain. The board coexists at a normal return in the growing and flat paths and takes the chain only when the chain is worth less than its fleet; the die's USD 10 M fleet takes the chain on every flat or shrinking path by year 3 to 5. The pass line's "small network": the board's pass holds at 42 TH/s and IGN 1.00 (the growing path's year 4), so it does not need one; the die's failure is worst in a small network, and a large one only delays it.

8a. Amendment, 17:1x UK: the market-structure axis, at the adversary lane's placed energies

The complete 2.0 plan (docs/plans/igneum-2.0.md at b943c047, the addendum) adds MARKET STRUCTURE as a scenario axis: private supply (the operator self-mining a fixed fleet), public hardware sales (one manufacturer selling units at twice their hardware term, buyers entering at cost up to a year's production), multiple suppliers (three derivative designs at a 1.2x markup and three times the production), and concentration (the largest single supplier's share of the chain's hash). The three chips are scored at the adversary lane's PLACED whole-machine energies (the design's 10.0r: the board 1.6x node-for-node and 1.9x a node ahead, the stored-half hybrid 2.4x and 2.9x, the die 2.4x and 3.3x, per joule against the 5090 at its lock; per-dollar unchanged), which replace the chip-model energies of sections 2 and 12 for this axis. Budget USD 10 M (a fleet, or a year's production); entry at year 2; the bought fleet is sunk and stays while revenue covers its power; the per-class GPU supply curve of section 9. Script scratchpad/market.py on build-4, 17:07 UK; all modelled.

First, the chips re-scored at the placed energies (sunk, 3 years, at 0.06):

Chip, placed energy	Cost per accepted MH/s-hour, node-for-node / a node ahead	(a) against the best Blackwell owner at 0.12 (line 1.5x)	(b) hardware over the 5080 entrant's (line 0.25)	(e) joules at the knee (line 3x): vs the 5090 lock / the 5070 Ti knee	Label
GDDR7 board, 1.6x / 1.9x	363 / 343 micro-USD	0.72x / 0.76x: PASSES	0.52: PASSES	1.6x / 1.2x; 1.9x / 1.4x: PASSES	modelled on the adversary lane's rows
Stored-half hybrid, 2.4x / 2.9x	186 / 172	1.41x / 1.52x: ON THE LINE	0.23: FAILS by a hair	2.4x / 1.75x; 2.9x / 2.1x: PASSES	the same
N2 SRAM die, 2.4x / 3.3x	115 / 92	2.29x / 2.84x: FAILS	0.07: FAILS	2.4x / 1.75x; 3.3x / 2.4x: PASSES today, on the line a node ahead	the same

At the placed energies the die passes (e) where the chip-model energy failed it, and still fails (a), (b), (c) and (f): its ticket, not its joules, is what fails it, which is the floor file's reading from the other side.

The five-year run with the axis (chip share of the hash / the supplier's margin / the largest single supplier's share / GPU classes above water, at years 2, 3 and 5):

Chip	Structure	Growing x2 from 0.10	Flat 0.10	Shrinking x0.5 from 0.30
Board	private supply	9 / 59 / 9 / 14; 7 / 52 / 7 / 15; 5 / 63 / 5 / 16	14 / 49 / 14 / 12; 16 / 23 / 16 / 11; 24 / 12 / 24 / 6	10 / 55 / 10 / 13; 22 / 15 / 22 / 8; 91 / -57 / 91 / 2
Board	hardware sales	4 / 60 / 4 / 14; 5 / 52 / 5 / 15; 8 / 63 / 8 / 16	3 / 49 / 3 / 12; 3 / 23 / 3 / 11; 6 / 12 / 6 / 6	3 / 55 / 3 / 13; 8 / 20 / 8 / 11; 39 / -23 / 39 / 4
Board	multiple suppliers	24 / 56 / 8 / 13; 31 / 45 / 10 / 14; 42 / 57 / 14 / 15	25 / 46 / 8 / 12; 37 / 18 / 12 / 11; 66 / 2 / 22 / 6	25 / 52 / 8 / 12; 45 / 7 / 15 / 6; 100 / -236 / 33 / 0
Hybrid	private supply	19 / 78 / 19 / 13; 16 / 75 / 16 / 15; 10 / 81 / 10 / 16	29 / 72 / 29 / 11; 39 / 57 / 39 / 11; 64 / 51 / 64 / 6	23 / 76 / 23 / 13; 42 / 52 / 42 / 6; 100 / -65 / 100 / 0
Hybrid	hardware sales	19 / 78 / 19 / 13; 30 / 72 / 30 / 14; 35 / 79 / 35 / 15	29 / 72 / 29 / 11; 49 / 54 / 49 / 8; 89 / 38 / 89 / 4	23 / 76 / 23 / 13; 50 / 52 / 50 / 6; 100 / -121 / 100 / 0
Hybrid	multiple suppliers	49 / 74 / 16 / 12; 70 / 64 / 23 / 12; 78 / 70 / 26 / 13	69 / 64 / 23 / 6; 95 / 31 / 32 / 3; 100 / -42 / 33 / 0	57 / 70 / 19 / 11; 97 / 22 / 32 / 2; 100 / -158 / 33 / 0
Die	private supply	50 / 84 / 50 / 12; 43 / 81 / 43 / 13; 30 / 89 / 30 / 15	70 / 78 / 70 / 6; 89 / 64 / 89 / 6; 100 / 48 / 100 / 0	58 / 82 / 58 / 11; 96 / 55 / 96 / 3; 100 / -177 / 100 / 0
Die	hardware sales	50 / 84 / 50 / 12; 71 / 77 / 71 / 12; 79 / 84 / 79 / 12	70 / 78 / 70 / 6; 99 / 50 / 99 / 2; 100 / -2 / 100 / 0	58 / 82 / 58 / 11; 100 / 42 / 100 / 1; 100 / -57 / 100 / 0
Die	multiple suppliers	95 / 75 / 32 / 6; 99 / 52 / 33 / 2; 100 / 61 / 33 / 2	100 / 52 / 33 / 0; 100 / 5 / 33 / 0; 100 / -57 / 33 / 0	98 / 67 / 33 / 3; 100 / -29 / 33 / 0; 100 / -57 / 33 / 0

Reading, per structure:

1. Private supply is the first cut's row: the board coexists (5 to 24 percent of the chain at a 12 to 63 percent margin, 6 to 16 classes above water) except in a shrinking chain's last year; the hybrid coexists in a growing chain (10 to 19 percent) and takes a flat or shrinking one (64 to 100 percent by year 5); the die takes the chain on every flat or shrinking path by year 3 to 5 and holds 30 to 50 percent of a growing one.
2. Public hardware sales LOWER the board's and raise the hybrid's and the die's share: a manufacturer's markup doubles the buyer's hardware term, which is most of the board's cost (its share falls to 3 to 8 percent, with 4 to 16 classes above water) and a small part of the die's (its cumulative production takes 79 to 100 percent of the chain by year 3 to 5 on every path). Selling the die is worse for coexistence than mining it privately, because a sold fleet keeps growing while the price covers its power and a private one is fixed.
3. Multiple suppliers raise every chip's share (three times the production at a lower markup) and lower the largest supplier's share to a third of it: the board's three suppliers hold 24 to 66 percent of the chain between them at 8 to 22 percent each with 6 to 15 classes above water in the growing and flat paths (coexistence with a less concentrated supply), and take a shrinking chain outright; the hybrid's and the die's three suppliers take the chain on every path but the growing one (49 to 100 percent), with the largest at a third.
4. Concentration is the fourth column: a private fleet is one operator and one supplier at its whole share; a sold fleet is one supplier at its whole share and many operators; three suppliers cap any one at a third. The dependence table of section 11 reads the same fact in wafers: the chain is 17 to 128 N2 wafers from one supplier at any price in the window.

The condition this adds to section 12: (h) the supply structure. The success statement holds for the board under every structure in the growing and flat paths (its largest supplier never above 24 percent of the chain, its margin a normal return, 6 to 16 classes above water) and fails for it only in a shrinking chain's last year; it holds for the hybrid only under private supply in a growing chain; it fails for the die under every structure on every path except private supply in a growing chain, and a sold or multi-sourced die is worse than a privately mined one. Hardware sales and multiple suppliers, which the GPU side has by nature, are what make a chip's supply grow with the price and are therefore not a mitigation for the die; they are one for the board, whose cost is the hardware they mark up.

The figures above and every threshold in this document live in docs/analysis/class-v6/coexistence-workbook.md with their assumptions in columns; none is served as a boundary.

9. Miners react with no fixed shares (D4: new)

The reaction rule replacing the first cut's single rule: each class participates with a fraction of its base, the third of the base already owned joining as revenue per MH/s-hour rises from its owner cost to its entrant cost (linearly) and the other two thirds entering when revenue exceeds the entrant cost; the installed base is the cap; re-entry on a price rise is automatic (the growing path's year 4: 12.9 to 37.7 TH/s as 16 of 17 classes come back); the chip fleet is fixed after entry. The equilibrium revenue per MH/s-hour and the GPU hash are solved each year by bisection. Against the single-rule first cut the shares move: the USD 10 M die fleet holds 50 percent on landing in the growing path (the first cut read 37) and 70 percent on the flat path (73), and the board holds 9 to 24 percent (10 to 31): the per-class curve lets the cheaper classes stay longer and the dearer ones leave sooner, and the totals are within 5 points of the first cut. The operator simulation carries the same reaction at a one-day step with proving as a third choice; its D1 shock (a 1 TH/s die fleet) moves 1,500 of 9,177 mining cards to proving.

10. The operator simulation (D4 item 2, beside this model)

docs/analysis/class-v6/operator-simulation.md: operators choose per day among mine, internal prove, external prove and off by profit at the marginal rate, under four shocks. At launch-shape demand every shock is restored in 0 periods (idle GPU capacity dwarfs the proving work). In a capacity-limited world (1 percent of the cards, the measured 5.5 percent proving efficiency) a lasting 1,000x proving spike is NOT restored within 150 periods when the internal pool is a fixed sum (provers go to the external fee market and the internal backlog grows without bound) and is restored in 35 periods with the resolution's congestion-priced internal proving fee; the price fall, the departure of the six largest proving cohorts, the mining entrant and the proving entrant are restored in 0 periods in both worlds. No parameter was changed by hand in any run. The one design finding: the fixed pool is a subsidy, not a price, and internal proving needs the congestion-priced fee the resolution gives it.

11. Accessible supply, and the dependence on suppliers and operators (D4: its own table)

IGN price	Network hash at the GPU equilibrium (per-class curve)	Share of the installed base available to mining (44.7 TH/s, approximate)	GPU suppliers	In N2 SRAM dies / wafers from ONE supplier	In DRAM boards	The largest single GPU operator today (a 1 percent fleet)	Label
0.03	5.6 TH/s	12 percent	NVIDIA (16 of 17 classes), AMD, Apple; tens of millions of cards in the world	1,000 dies / 17 wafers	34,000	0.06 TH/s	modelled
0.10	9.6	21	the same	1,700 / 29	58,000	0.10	modelled
0.30	20	44	the same	3,600 / 60	119,000	0.20	modelled
1.00	42	95	the same; past this the installed base binds and used prices rise	7,700 / 128	255,000	0.42	modelled

The GPU side has three suppliers, a used market, a use outside mining (the rental yields of section 2) and no operator above a percent of the hash; the die's whole chain is one wafer allocation (17 to 128 wafers of a node booked to 2028, claimed) and the board's a Bitmain-class run of 34,000 to 255,000 units with a commodity memory bill. Dependence on a single supplier: total for the die at every price, partial for the board (a run that size is visible and takes months), nil for the GPU side; dependence on a single operator: a chip fleet is one operator by construction (the operator simulation's D1), a GPU fleet of the same hash is tens of thousands of owners.

12. The conditions under which the success statement holds (the result)

Condition	The number on today's rows	DRAM board (chip-model ticket USD 5.6; at the final USD 4.84 see 12b)	SRAM die at the 300 W machine ticket, USD 2.94 (12b, SUPERSEDED by the reconciled USD 1.0 of 12c, at which (a) 2.06x and (b) 0.09 FAIL and (c) is 12.6x short)	SRAM die at the silicon floor, USD 0.6 (the lower bound, not a machine; the reconciled ticket lands near it)
(a) the chip's all-in cost per accepted unit at its own electricity within about 1.5x of the best GPU owner's at the GPU's electricity	the owner at 0.12: 263 to 332 micro-USD (5070 Ti, 5080)	307 at 3 y, 750 at 1 y: PASSES	211 / 190 (node-for-node / a node ahead): 1.24x / 1.39x, PASSES	72 to 134: FAILS at every life
(b) the chip's annualised hardware per MH/s not below about a quarter of the GPU entrant's	the 5080 entrant's hardware 460 micro-USD	239 to 677: PASSES	0.27 of it: PASSES by a hair	33 to 95 (0.07): FAILS
(c) a fleet above a third of the chain's hash costs more than a year's miner revenue (the inequality: a third of the equilibrium hash x the ticket in USD per MH/s > the year's miner revenue)	at IGN 0.03 / 0.10 / 0.30 / 1.00 the chain is 5.6 / 9.6 / 19.7 / 42.3 TH/s, a third 1.9 / 3.2 / 6.6 / 14.1; the year's revenue USD 12 / 40 / 120 / 400 M	USD 10 / 18 / 37 / 79 M of boards at USD 5.6 per MH/s: FAILS at every price by 1.2x to 5.1x (the first cut's "PASSES above IGN 0.05" was a hand-written cell contradicting the inequality, corrected 19:5x UK on review B's F09(c); at the final USD 4.84, 15 M against 40 M, 2.6x short)	USD 9.4 M against 40 M: FAILS by 4.3x (2.2x to 9.7x across IGN 0.03 to 1.00)	USD 1.5 / 2.5 / 5.3 / 11.3 M of dies at USD 0.8: FAILS by 8x to 35x
(d) GPUs keep a resale market and a use outside mining	resale 25 to 55 percent after two years; rental 3x to 5x the mining cost	PASSES (the GPU side's property)	PASSES (the same)	PASSES (the same)
(e) the per-joule gap at the honest knee stays under about 3x	Blackwell at the knee 1.70 to 2.06 microjoules	2.2x to 2.6x: PASSES	2.3x node-for-node: PASSES; 3.1x a node ahead: on the line	3.7x to 4.5x at the chip-model energy: FAILS (the bare-lane floor 10x to 12x)
(f) the supplier's gross margin is a normal return (under about 70 percent) and does not rise with the halvings	section 8 and 12b	27 to 69 percent, falling with the halvings: PASSES	72 to 79 percent on the growing path, 49 to 69 flat, a loss once it is the chain: FAILS	85 to 93 percent, rising, or a loss once it is the chain: FAILS
(g) a second income (proving) that the specialised hardware cannot earn and its owner can buy into only at the GPU entrant's cost (amended 19:5x UK, F09(g), section 5a)	section 5: USD 3 to 7 a card-day at launch demand on the 16 GB and larger tiers; 0 for any hash engine; a hybrid operator with companion GPUs keeps 85 to 90 percent of the sunk owner's proving surplus on consumer cards	holds for the GPU as a device (the proving fleet is GPUs whoever owns them); NOT an exclusive advantage of the GPU owner as a business: the hybrid operator captures it	the same	the same

Every (c) cell, generated from the inequality and its inputs (review B's F09(c), 19:5x UK; sim/economy/coexist/market.py M3 and the equilibrium hashes of section 11): a third of the chain's hash at the per-class equilibrium, times the chip's ticket, against the year's miner revenue.

Ticket (USD per MH/s)	IGN 0.03 (USD 12 M a year; a third of the chain 1.9 TH/s)	0.10 (40 M; 3.2 TH/s)	0.30 (120 M; 6.6 TH/s)	1.00 (400 M; 14.1 TH/s)	Verdict
GDDR7 board, chip model 5.6	10.4 M, 1.2x short	17.8 M, 2.2x short	36.8 M, 3.3x short	78.9 M, 5.1x short	FAILS at every price
GDDR7 machine, final 4.84	9.0 M, 1.3x	15.4 M, 2.6x	31.8 M, 3.8x	68.2 M, 5.9x	FAILS
Hybrid, chip model 2.44	4.5 M, 2.6x	7.8 M, 5.1x	16.0 M, 7.5x	34.4 M, 11.6x	FAILS
Hybrid, final 2.80	5.2 M, 2.3x	8.9 M, 4.5x	18.4 M, 6.5x	39.5 M, 10.1x	FAILS
SRAM die, reconciled 1.0	1.9 M, 6.5x	3.2 M, 12.6x	6.6 M, 18x	14.1 M, 28x	FAILS
SRAM die, silicon floor 0.8 with the board (0.6 bare)	1.5 M, 8x	2.5 M, 16x	5.3 M, 23x	11.3 M, 35x	FAILS

Condition (c) as written is met by no chip at any price in the window: a chip fleet holding a third of the chain always costs less than a year of the chain's miner revenue, because every chip in the model is 3x to 15x cheaper per MH/s than the GPUs that set the equilibrium. The condition therefore does not discriminate between the chips; what does is the ratio by which each fails (1.2x to 5.9x for the DRAM board against 8x to 35x for the die), which is the dependence on a single supplier of section 11 read as money. The board's verdict is six of seven at both tickets (it fails (c) only), not seven; the first cut's seven was the hand-written cell.

The result (as amended on the pinned ticket, 17:4x UK, and on F09(c) at 19:5x). The success statement holds for the stored-dataset DRAM-board chip on six of the seven conditions at a 1 to 3 year life on today's rows, in every price path, at every electricity price on the axis, with the GPU side's own generation curve narrowing the gap further and proving as a second income the chip cannot enter; its pass needs no small network (it holds at 42 TH/s and IGN 1.00), no token appreciation (it holds on the flat and shrinking paths) and no scheduled ASIC death (the life axis, not the rotation, is what the board lives on). For the N2 SRAM die at the pinned complete-machine ticket (USD 2.94 per MH/s) the statement holds under private supply in a growing chain only (16 / 14 / 8 percent of the chain, 13 to 16 GPU classes above water) and fails on flat and shrinking paths by year 5 and under hardware sales or multiple suppliers on those paths, on conditions (c) and (f); at the silicon floor (USD 0.6, the lower bound) it fails at any life, price path or electricity price. A small network makes the die worse at either ticket, appreciation only delays it, and the rotation does not touch a programmable die. The model names where it fails: a sunk SRAM die fleet of USD 10 M in a flat or shrinking chain at the pinned ticket (16 to 25 percent of the chain on landing, 56 to 100 percent by year 5), and at any price in the window at the silicon floor (50 to 70 percent on landing). The only condition that holds the die is that nobody pays to build it (section 6: IGN 0.73 for a USD 150 M project at a third of the chain over three years, 0.22 taking the chain, 0.12 to 0.16 for a revision), which is a statement about an investor's decision and is carried as such, not as a level the chain stays below.

What the chain controls, from the model: the honest side's cost per accepted unit (every cent of GPU electricity and every point of the knee moves (a) and (e); the lock already moves a Blackwell card 34 to 41 percent), the second income (proving demand and the congestion-priced fee that keeps internal proving served, the operator simulation's finding), the share detector that makes (c) visible the week it fails, and the dataset floor as the ticket (USD 1,500 to 3,000 per die at the schedule, which moves (c) by 2x to 4x and nothing else). Nothing in the hash moves (a), (b) or (e) for the die by the factor they need.

12a. Amendment, 17:0x UK: the third chip, the adversary lane's hybrid board, scored on the conditions and the surface

The adversary lane's D2(b) first row (17:3x UK, harness tools/chip-model/mf/flow/d2b.py on class-v6-adversary): the hottest half of the items in 1 GiB of N2 SRAM beside the 16-device DRAM board serves 72 percent of the reads; the activate-bound board runs 3.6x the hashes on the same devices (about 600 MH/s a board); 2.69x per joule against the 5090 at its lock, node for node (2.20 to 3.03); USD 1.88 per MH/s of silicon and memory (USD 2.44 with the system); USD 250 of SRAM a board (claimed); the uniform-store bound 2.30x and USD 3.34; the hottest three quarters 3.10x and USD 0.83; a node ahead 3.33x; the 5.5 GiB floor raises the SRAM ticket to USD 690 (USD 2.9 per MH/s) and not the ratio. Its joules per hash here: 2.33 microjoules (lane 4's 5090 class v5 lock floor) over 2.69, 0.87. Scored on this file's rows (scratchpad/hybrid.py, build-4, 17:03 UK; all modelled):

Hybrid row (sunk)	1 y / 3 y / 5 y at 0.06, micro-USD per accepted MH/s-hour	3 y at 0.12 / 0.25	Hardware / power at 0.06, 3 y
Hottest half (the first row)	371 / 178 / 139	232 / 349	104 / 71
Uniform-store bound	616 / 272 / 203	335 / 472	186 / 84
Hottest three quarters	195 / 109 / 92	156 / 258	46 / 62
A node ahead	357 / 164 / 125	207 / 302	104 / 58
At the 5.5 GiB floor (SRAM USD 690)	533 / 235 / 175	289 / 406	161 / 71
The pure board (reference)	750 / 307 / 219	356 / 463	239 / 65
The SRAM die (reference)	134 / 72 / 60	101 / 163	33 / 38

Condition	The hybrid at 3 years, sunk	Verdict
(a) all-in within 1.5x of the best GPU owner at the GPU's electricity	178 against the 5070 Ti owner's 263 at 0.12: 1.48x; against the 5080's 332: 1.87x; at 0.06, 0.9x and 1.1x	ON THE LINE: passes against the 5070 Ti at 0.12 and at any card at 0.06, fails against the 5080 and above at 0.12 and against every card at 0.25 (1.5x to 3.4x)
(b) hardware not under a quarter of the GPU entrant's	104 against the 5080 entrant's 459: 0.23	FAILS by a hair (0.25 is the line); the uniform-store and floor rows pass (0.41, 0.35), the hottest-three-quarters row fails (0.10)
(c) a third of the chain costs more than a year's miner revenue	USD 4.5 / 7.8 / 16 / 34 M for a third at IGN 0.03 / 0.10 / 0.30 / 1.00 against USD 12 / 40 / 120 / 400 M	FAILS at every price (a third of the chain costs a tenth to a third of a year's revenue); the 5.5 GiB floor raises it 1.2x
(d) GPUs keep resale and a use outside mining	the GPU side's property	PASSES
(e) the per-joule gap at the honest knee under 3x	2.69x against the 5090 at the lock, 2.38x against the 5080's knee, 1.96x against the 5070 Ti's; 3.33x a node ahead	PASSES today, on the line a node ahead
(f) a normal margin that does not rise with the halvings	the five-year runs below: 57 to 83 percent, rising on the flat path	FAILS on the flat and shrinking paths, passes (falling, 75 to 83) on the growing one
(g) a second income the supplier cannot enter	a hash engine: 0	PASSES (the GPU's advantage over it)

Five years with a sunk USD 10 M hybrid fleet (4.1 TH/s at USD 2.44 per MH/s), the per-class supply curve:

Path	Year 2	Year 3	Year 5	GPU classes above water
Growing x2 from 0.10	19 percent; margin 79	17 percent; 76	10 percent; 83	13, 15, 16
Flat 0.10	29 percent; 73	39 percent; 59	64 percent; 57	11, 11, 6
Shrinking x0.5 from 0.30	23 percent; 77	42 percent; 55	100 percent; -47	13, 6, 0

On the surface (operator self-mining, T0 2 years, edge 2.7x, hardware USD 2.44 per MH/s; the development cost the board's plus a share of a 1 GiB SRAM die's, three rows): p* in USD per IGN at L 1 / 3 years and q 0.3 / 1.0: C_dev 50 M: 0.80 / 0.26 at a third, 0.24 / 0.08 taking the chain; 125 M: 1.99 / 0.66 and 0.60 / 0.20; 225 M: 3.59 / 1.18 and 1.08 / 0.36. The margin is 0.87 at 3 years and 0.66 at 1.

Reading: the hybrid sits between the two references on every row, nearer the die on the ticket and nearer the board on the joules. It passes (d), (e) and (g), sits on the line of (a) (it passes against the cheapest Blackwell card at the GPU's 0.12 and against every card at 0.06, and fails at 0.25), fails (b) by a hair on its first row and (c) at every price, and fails (f) on the flat and shrinking paths. The success statement therefore holds for the pure board only, as the research lane's first reading said; the hybrid is a coexistence case in a growing chain at cheap GPU electricity (10 to 19 percent of the chain at 76 to 83 percent margins, 13 to 16 classes above water) and a failure case in a flat or shrinking one (64 to 100 percent by year 5). What distinguishes it from the die is that its ticket is a board's (USD 2.44 per MH/s, 8 to 34 M for a third of the chain) rather than a wafer's, so condition (c) fails by 3x to 10x rather than 20x to 100x, and the dataset floor moves it (1.2x at 5.5 GiB, more at 8.5 and 11.5 as the SRAM half grows) where it did not move the die at all; the floor is a real lever on this chip and the schedule's ticket argument (the floor file 3.2) applies to it at the SRAM's USD 250 per GiB.

12b. Amendment, 17:1x UK: the re-run at the adversary lane's FINAL placed energies and corrected tickets, and one verdict that moves

The adversary lane's final rows (the design's 10.0t): the complete GDDR7 machine 1.5x per joule node-for-node (1.3x to 1.7x), 1.8x a node ahead, USD 4.84 per MH/s; the stored-half hybrid at the reconciled mean hit rate 0.581, 1.93x (1.65x to 2.12x), 2.40x a node ahead, USD 2.80 per MH/s (the p98 program 2.09x and USD 1.88); the N2 die 2.3x / 3.1x at USD 2.94 per MH/s as a complete machine (2.14 at the smaller ticket). The tickets are taken as given (complete machines, no system markup added). The die's ticket is the material change: the chip model's USD 0.6 per MH/s (lane B's USD 0.25 to 0.4 of silicon plus the board, sections 2 and 12) against the adversary lane's 2.94 for the whole machine, a 5x difference that this file carries as two rows with their sources rather than resolving. Re-scored (scratchpad/market.py, build-4, 17:14 UK; all modelled; sunk, 3 years, at 0.06):

Chip at the final rows	Cost per accepted MH/s-hour, node-for-node / a node ahead	(a) vs the best Blackwell owner at 0.12 (line 1.5x)	(b) hardware over the 5080 entrant's (line 0.25)	(c) a third of the chain at IGN 0.03 / 0.10 / 0.30 / 1.00 against a year's revenue	(e) joules vs the 5090 lock / the 5070 Ti knee (line 3x)	Verdict
GDDR7 machine, 1.5x / 1.8x, USD 4.84	338 / 317	0.78x / 0.83x: PASSES	0.45: PASSES	USD 9 / 15 / 32 / 68 M against 12 / 40 / 120 / 400: short 1.3x to 5.9x, FAILS	1.5x / 1.1x; 1.8x / 1.3x: PASSES	passes (a), (b), (d), (e), (g); (c) fails by 1.3x to 5.9x (it failed by less at the chip-model ticket, 5.6); (f) 19 to 66 percent, passes: the board's verdict holds
Stored-half hybrid, 1.93x / 2.40x, USD 2.80	221 / 202	1.19x / 1.30x: PASSES (was on the line)	0.26: PASSES by a hair (was 0.23, a fail by a hair)	5 / 9 / 18 / 40 M: short 2.3x to 10x, FAILS	1.9x / 1.4x; 2.4x / 1.75x: PASSES	(c) and (f) fail: its verdict holds (coexistence under private supply in a growing chain, failure on flat and shrinking paths)
The hybrid at the p98 program, 2.09x, USD 1.88	174 / 156	1.51x / 1.69x: on the line / fails	0.18: FAILS	3.5 / 6 / 12 / 27 M: short 3.4x to 15x	2.1x / 1.5x: passes	the first reading's row (12a)
N2 SRAM die, 2.3x / 3.1x, USD 2.94 (the adversary lane's complete machine)	211 / 190	1.24x / 1.39x: PASSES (was 2.3x to 2.8x at USD 0.6)	0.27: PASSES by a hair (was 0.07)	5.5 / 9.4 / 19 / 41 M: short 2.2x to 9.7x, FAILS (was 20x to 100x)	2.3x / 1.7x: passes; 3.1x / 2.3x: on the line a node ahead	the die's verdict MOVES at this ticket: from "fails (a), (b), (c), (e), (f) at every life, path and tariff" to the hybrid's verdict, "passes (a), (b), (d), (e), (g); fails (c) and (f); coexists under private supply in a growing chain and takes a flat or shrinking chain by year 5"
N2 SRAM die at the smaller ticket, USD 2.14	177 / 155	1.49x / 1.69x: on the line / fails	0.20: FAILS	4 / 7 / 14 / 30 M: short 3x to 13x	the same	between the two rows above
N2 SRAM die at the chip model's ticket, USD 0.6 (sections 2 and 12)	72	2.2x to 4.6x: FAILS	0.07: FAILS	2.3 M at IGN 0.10: short 16x	3.7x to 4.5x at the chip-model energy: FAILS	the first cut's verdict

The five-year run at the final rows (a sunk USD 10 M fleet; chip share / margin / largest supplier / GPU classes at years 2, 3, 5):

Chip	Structure	Growing x2 from 0.10	Flat 0.10	Shrinking x0.5 from 0.30
Board (USD 4.84)	private	10 / 61 / 10 / 13; 8 / 56 / 8 / 15; 5 / 66 / 5 / 16	16 / 52 / 16 / 12; 18 / 28 / 18 / 11; 27 / 19 / 27 / 6	11 / 58 / 11 / 13; 25 / 19 / 25 / 8; 98 / -56 / 98 / 1
Board	hardware sales	6 / 62 / 6 / 14; 8 / 56 / 8 / 15; 13 / 65 / 13 / 16	5 / 53 / 5 / 12; 6 / 28 / 6 / 11; 10 / 19 / 10 / 6	6 / 58 / 6 / 13; 13 / 24 / 13 / 11; 60 / -21 / 60 / 3
Board	multiple suppliers	27 / 58 / 9 / 13; 37 / 48 / 12 / 13; 47 / 58 / 16 / 15	31 / 48 / 10 / 11; 45 / 19 / 15 / 8; 78 / 0 / 26 / 6	30 / 54 / 10 / 12; 66 / 13 / 22 / 6; 100 / -194 / 33 / 0
Hybrid (USD 2.80)	private	17 / 74 / 17 / 13; 15 / 70 / 15 / 15; 9 / 78 / 9 / 16	26 / 67 / 26 / 12; 35 / 50 / 35 / 11; 58 / 45 / 58 / 6	20 / 72 / 20 / 13; 39 / 43 / 39 / 6; 100 / -68 / 100 / 0
Hybrid	hardware sales	17 / 74 / 17 / 13; 27 / 68 / 27 / 14; 32 / 75 / 32 / 15	25 / 67 / 25 / 12; 41 / 49 / 41 / 9; 76 / 38 / 76 / 6	20 / 72 / 20 / 13; 42 / 43 / 42 / 6; 100 / -92 / 100 / 0
Hybrid	multiple suppliers	44 / 71 / 15 / 12; 62 / 59 / 21 / 12; 72 / 67 / 24 / 13	64 / 60 / 21 / 8; 91 / 28 / 30 / 6; 100 / -39 / 33 / 0	52 / 67 / 17 / 11; 94 / 18 / 31 / 3; 100 / -149 / 33 / 0
Die (USD 2.94)	private	16 / 75 / 16 / 13; 14 / 72 / 14 / 15; 8 / 79 / 8 / 16	25 / 69 / 25 / 12; 33 / 53 / 33 / 11; 56 / 49 / 56 / 6	20 / 73 / 20 / 13; 38 / 46 / 38 / 6; 100 / -51 / 100 / 0
Die	hardware sales	16 / 75 / 16 / 13; 26 / 69 / 26 / 14; 31 / 77 / 31 / 15	25 / 69 / 25 / 12; 41 / 51 / 41 / 10; 76 / 41 / 76 / 6	20 / 73 / 20 / 13; 41 / 46 / 41 / 6; 100 / -74 / 100 / 0
Die	multiple suppliers	43 / 72 / 14 / 12; 61 / 61 / 20 / 12; 70 / 70 / 23 / 13	63 / 62 / 21 / 8; 90 / 32 / 30 / 6; 100 / -33 / 33 / 0	50 / 69 / 17 / 12; 94 / 22 / 31 / 3; 100 / -203 / 33 / 0

Reading: at the adversary lane's ticket the die's five-year rows are the hybrid's within a few points (a USD 10 M fleet is 3.4 TH/s at USD 2.94 against 16 TH/s at 0.6), so the die and the hybrid share one verdict and the board keeps its own. What moved and why: the die's whole failure in sections 2, 8 and 12 was its ticket (USD 0.6 per MH/s of silicon and board, lane B's die at USD 500 for 5.5 GH/s), which made a third of the chain cost a tenth to a thirtieth of a year's revenue and put a USD 10 M fleet at 70 to 100 percent of the chain; at the adversary lane's USD 2.94 for the complete machine the same fleet is 16 to 25 percent and conditions (a) and (b) pass. The joules never decided it (both lanes read the die at 2.3x to 3.3x per joule at the knee, inside condition (e)). The two tickets: lane B priced the die's silicon, the adversary lane priced a machine (power, cooling, board, the node it must run, the yield and the packaging). The coordinator's pin (17:38 UK): the model's die ticket is the adversary lane's complete-machine figure, USD 2.94, under the plan's evidence standard (complete-board overhead, same-node and advanced-node results kept separate); the USD 0.6 row stays as the silicon floor, a lower bound and not a machine. The served reading until the adversary lane's one-line reconciliation of what its ticket includes (asked by 18:30 UK) is the range: "a sunk SRAM die fleet of USD 10 M holds 16 to 70 percent of the chain on landing depending on whether its machine costs USD 3 or USD 0.6 per MH/s, and takes a flat or shrinking chain by year 5 at either".

The success statement at the final rows: holds for the board under every structure in growing and flat paths; holds for the hybrid and the die (at the adversary lane's ticket) under private supply in a growing chain only, and fails for both on flat and shrinking paths and under hardware sales or multiple suppliers on those paths; fails for the die at the chip model's ticket everywhere. The conditions that fail the die at either ticket are (c) and (f), the ticket and the margin, which the dataset floor moves 1.2x to 2x and the share detector makes visible; nothing in the hash moves them further.

12c. Amendment, 17:2x UK: the die at the adversary lane's RECONCILED ticket, and the range narrowed

The adversary lane's reconciliation (multi-family-adversary.md section 15 at d3ad1549): the two figures priced different machines. Lane B's USD 0.25 to 0.4 of silicon (0.6 with a board) is the 2 GiB die at zero shadow, 2,100 MH/s per reticle at 300 W with no shadow core; the USD 2.94 is the same die carrying the class v4 shadow on the placed core (6.55 pJ per lane-op at N5, 13x the die's own energy per hash) with the machine held at 300 W, so it makes 383 MH/s and the fixed tickets divide by 383. Neither is the maker's choice: the power budget is raised until the power train and the core's silicon bind (the die's own read ceiling, 8.3 GH/s, is never reached). Components (the die USD 500, the shadow core's silicon USD 0.55 per MH/s on the placed slot or 0.11 to 0.2 pipelined, the package USD 60 to 200, the board USD 150 plus PSU and cooling at USD 0.15 per W, the host USD 15; claimed and approximate as the adversary lane labels them): 852 MH/s at 600 W, 1,420 at 1 kW, 2,130 at 1.5 kW, 2,840 at 2 kW; USD 1.63 / 1.20 / 0.98 / 0.88 per MH/s on the placed core, 1.07 / 0.73 / 0.56 / 0.47 pipelined with the organic package. The reconciled unit ticket: about USD 1.0 per MH/s (0.5 to 1.6) at 1 to 1.5 kW per machine; per joule unchanged (2.3x node-for-node, 3.1x a node ahead). The adversary lane adds that a maker's first batch of 1,000 dies (1 to 2 TH/s, several times the chain's hash at the rental equilibrium) pays the project (USD 100 M to 500 M) as USD 50 to 250 per MH/s of NRE against USD 1 of unit cost, plus first-yield losses of USD 100 to 400 per die: the die's economics are project economics (the surface, section 6), and the unit ticket of a fleet that exists is USD 1.0.

Re-scored at the reconciled ticket and its bounds (scratchpad/market.py, build-4, 17:23 UK; sunk, 3 years, at 0.06; all modelled):

Die ticket	Cost per accepted MH/s-hour, node-for-node / a node ahead	(a) vs the best Blackwell owner at 0.12 (line 1.5x)	(b) hardware over the 5080 entrant's (line 0.25)	(c) a third of the chain at IGN 0.03 / 0.10 / 0.30 / 1.00, short of a year's revenue by	(e)	(f) margin, growing path
USD 1.0, reconciled	128 / 106	2.06x / 2.48x: FAILS	0.09: FAILS	6.5x / 12.6x / 18x / 28x: FAILS	2.3x passes; 3.1x on the line	80 to 88 percent: FAILS
USD 0.5, the low bound	106 / 84	2.48x / 3.12x: FAILS	0.05: FAILS	13x to 57x: FAILS	the same	81 to 89: FAILS
USD 1.6, the high bound	153 / 132	1.71x / 1.99x: FAILS	0.15: FAILS	4.0x to 18x: FAILS	the same	78 to 85: FAILS
USD 2.94 (the 300 W machine, 12b)	211 / 190	1.24x / 1.39x: passed	0.27: passed by a hair	2.2x to 9.7x: fails	the same	72 to 79: fails
USD 0.6 (the silicon floor, zero shadow)	72	2.2x to 4.6x: fails	0.07: fails	16x: fails	3.7x to 4.5x at the chip-model energy: fails	85 to 93: fails

The five-year run at the reconciled ticket (a sunk USD 10 M fleet, 10 TH/s; share / margin / largest supplier / GPU classes above water at years 2, 3, 5; the bounds in brackets as the year-2 share):

Structure	Growing x2 from 0.10	Flat 0.10	Shrinking x0.5 from 0.30
Private supply	42 / 83 / 42 / 13; 36 / 80 / 36 / 13; 24 / 88 / 24 / 16 (27 to 68 at year 2)	62 / 77 / 62 / 8; 80 / 65 / 80 / 6; 98 / 53 / 98 / 2 (40 to 93)	49 / 81 / 49 / 12; 88 / 58 / 88 / 5; 100 / -147 / 100 / 0 (33 to 78)
Hardware sales	42 / 83 / 42 / 13; 60 / 77 / 60 / 12; 70 / 83 / 70 / 13	62 / 77 / 62 / 8; 95 / 53 / 95 / 3; 100 / 4 / 100 / 0	49 / 81 / 49 / 12; 97 / 47 / 97 / 2; 100 / -69 / 100 / 0
Multiple suppliers	84 / 76 / 28 / 6; 98 / 57 / 33 / 5; 99 / 65 / 33 / 5	99 / 58 / 33 / 2; 100 / 11 / 33 / 0; 100 / -64 / 33 / 0	95 / 70 / 32 / 6; 100 / -12 / 33 / 0; 100 / -69 / 33 / 0

The verdict at the reconciled ticket, which replaces 12b's as the die's headline: the die fails (a), (b), (c) and (f) at USD 1.0 and at both bounds, and passes only (d), (e) and (g); the 12b pass of (a) and (b) was an artefact of the 300 W machine (a die throttled to 383 MH/s), and the pinned complete-machine ticket, once reconciled, lands nearer lane B's floor than the 300 W figure. A sunk USD 10 M fleet holds 42 percent of a growing chain on landing (27 to 68 at the bounds) and 62 percent of a flat one (40 to 93), and takes every flat or shrinking chain by year 3 to 5 under every structure; in a growing chain under private supply it dilutes to 24 percent by year 5 with 16 classes above water, which is the one cell where the share is a coexistence share while the conditions still fail. The range narrows from "16 to 70 percent on landing" to "42 percent of a growing chain and 62 percent of a flat one on landing (27 to 93 across the reconciled bounds), and 100 percent of a flat or shrinking chain by year 3 to 5"; the die's success statement does not hold at any reconciled ticket, and the only condition that holds the die stays the project economics of section 6 (the adversary lane's NRE of USD 50 to 250 per MH/s against USD 1 of unit cost says the same thing from the maker's side). The hybrid's verdict (12a, at its own reconciled USD 2.80) and the board's (six of seven at USD 4.84) are unchanged.

The surface row beside it (the die's economics are project economics). The operator self-mining, T0 2 years, edge 2.3x, the unit ticket USD 1.0 per MH/s (the 0.5 and 1.6 ends in brackets), the first batch's yield loss (1,000 dies at USD 100 to 400 each, USD 0.6 to 0.9 M) added to C_dev and moving p* under 1 percent; p* in USD per IGN at L 1 / 3 years and q 0.3 / 1.0 (build-4, 17:25 UK; modelled):

C_dev	L 1 y, q 0.3	L 1 y, q 1.0	L 3 y, q 0.3	L 3 y, q 1.0	NRE per MH/s on a 1,000-die first batch (1.42 to 2.13 TH/s at 1 to 1.5 kW)
USD 100 M	1.28 (1.19 to 1.40)	0.38 (0.36 to 0.42)	0.50 (0.49 to 0.51)	0.15 (0.15 to 0.15)	USD 47 to 70
USD 250 M	3.17 (2.95 to 3.48)	0.95 (0.89 to 1.05)	1.24 (1.22 to 1.28)	0.37 (0.37 to 0.38)	USD 117 to 176
USD 500 M	6.33 (5.90 to 6.95)	1.90 (1.77 to 2.09)	2.48 (2.43 to 2.55)	0.75 (0.73 to 0.77)	USD 235 to 352

Reading: the unit ticket's whole band (0.5 to 1.6) moves p* by under 10 percent at a 1-year life and under 3 percent at 3 years; the project cost moves it 5x and the share 3x. The first batch's NRE of USD 47 to 352 per MH/s against a unit cost of USD 1 is the surface's statement from the maker's side: a die project is attractive only where the price its maker expects over the life exceeds IGN 0.15 to 0.75 taking the whole chain over three years, or 0.50 to 2.48 at a third, and it is never the unit ticket that decides. The coexistence verdict (the die fails once built) and the surface verdict (it is built only above those prices) are the two halves of the same row; the chain's instruments on the first are the honest side's efficiency and the share detector, on the second nothing in the hash.

13. The D4 checklist, line by line

Item	Where	Status
Growing and shrinking networks	section 8	in
Reduced issuance	section 8 (the halvings in years 3 and 5)	in
Cheap and dear electricity	sections 1 to 3	in
GPU replacement and resale on both sides, the 1.5x generation on the chip side too	section 4	in
Changing proving demand	section 5 (zero, launch, spike; the resolution's shape; the 12 GB measured zero)	in
Private mining and hardware sales	section 6	in
Several productive lifetimes (0.5, 1, 2, 3, 5)	section 7	in
Cheaper derivative chips	section 6 (the revision and shared-cost rows)	in
Miners react with no fixed shares (per-class supply curve, installed base cap, re-entry)	section 9	in
The outputs: cost advantage, replacement economics, accessible supply, break-even electricity per class (17), supplier and operator dependence as its own table	sections 1, 4, 11, 3, 11	in
The tariff advantage shown separately from the hardware advantage, the 6.25x illustration first	section 1	in
The operator simulation	section 10 and its own file	in (first run)
A third chip, the adversary lane's hybrid board, on the conditions and the surface	section 12a (amendment, 17:0x UK)	in
Market structure as a scenario axis (private supply, hardware sales, multiple suppliers, concentration), a row per structure for each of the three chips, at the adversary lane's placed energies	section 8a (amendment, 17:1x UK)	in
The sensitivity workbook: every threshold with its assumptions in columns, never served as a boundary	docs/analysis/class-v6/coexistence-workbook.md (171 rows, 17:1x UK)	in
The k lane's placed rows and the adversary lane's whole-machine rows	the chip rows stand until they land	owed by others
Per-card agents, the hybrid mode, the measured stage times in the simulation	the simulation's section 4	second cut

14. Unverified and owed

• Every chip-side figure is modelled; no chip has been measured. The chip's hardware per MH/s (USD 0.8 for the die with the system, 5.6 for the board) is the term conditions (b) and (c) rest on and is approximate within 2x.
• The card prices are street approximations of October 2026; the installed-base counts available to mining are approximate (the cap of 44.7 TH/s); the 5090's street price has been 2x MSRP this year.
• The Ada and Ampere knees are modelled (no rented host allows the lock); the Blackwell floors are measured on the 5090, 5080 and 4070.
• The proving rows rest on the bench table's shard times and the fleet lane's one measured day (with a fault); the proving fleet (5,000 cards) and the pool sharing by capacity are assumptions.
• The accepted-work factor, the wear allowance, the hosting and the rental yields are approximate.
• The emission beyond year 5 and the proving pool's fade are outside the run.
• Nothing was run on the Mac; the scripts ran on build-3 (first cut) and build-4 (this cut).