Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Documents-only copy of counter-asic-4 df7c85c1c (its delta over master 1ace22052: docs/analysis/class-v6, docs/design, docs/spec, the export list; nothing outside docs/ differs at that tip; the branch itself stays unmerged, its history carrying the igneum-pow research commits)
34 KiB
The coexistence model (second cut): can a specialised supplier earn a normal return while GPUs stay close enough to compete?
8 October 2026, 16:1x to 17:0x UK, branch class-v6-floor-sram, floor lane 3, Igneum 2.0 D4 (the research lane's word
of 17:0x UK; the founder's accepted external review replaces the capex wall with this model; the profitability surface
of docs/analysis/class-v6/floor/sram-and-floor.md section 4.4 is its base). Second cut; the section list is the D4
checklist so the pin can be closed line by line. Every row is modelled: the arithmetic is scratchpad/coexist.py
(the first cut, run on build-3 at 16:2x) and scratchpad/coexist2.py (this cut, run on build-4 at 16:52; build-3 was
down from 16:40); the card rows are lane 4's class v5 table (docs/analysis/class-v6/floor/denominator.md, section
10.4 of the design document: measured at the floor where it says so, modelled knees elsewhere), the chip rows the chip
model's (chip-model-v3 5.5 and 5.12, lane B, the k lane's 3.2 pJ per forced op), the proving rows the bench table's
shard times with the fleet lane's measured day on Devnet 3 (the 12 GB tier a measured zero for internal proving), the
prices street approximations. The operator simulation beside it is docs/analysis/class-v6/operator-simulation.md.
Nothing here is served; nothing is a measurement of a chip. The founder is not named.
The statement under test. Success: a specialised supplier earns a normal return and GPUs stay close enough in total cost, obtainable and useful outside mining, that entrants still compete. Failure: a supplier operating privately at much lower cost exhausts competitors' margins. The pass line, verbatim: the model names credible conditions for sustained commodity participation and names where it fails; a result needing a small network, token appreciation or scheduled ASIC death has not passed. The development cost is SUNK in the mandatory case (the opponent covers manufacturing, deployment and operation only); the paid-development cases sit beside it.
0. The result in one page
- The DRAM-board chip (a GPU's memory system with a programmable core) passes the success statement on today's rows; the N2 SRAM die fails it once it exists with its development sunk. With development sunk, a 3-year life and power at USD 0.06 per kWh, the board's cost per accepted MH/s-hour is 307 micro-USD against the best GPU owner's 156 to 204 at the same electricity and 415 to 588 for a new entrant (0.5x to 0.7x the owner, 1.4x to 1.9x the entrant); the die's is 72 (2.2x to 2.8x the owner, 5.8x to 8.2x the entrant; at the GPU's 0.12, 3.6x to 4.6x and 7.2x to 9.9x). In the five-year runs with a per-class supply curve the board at a sunk USD 10 M holds 4.5 to 24 percent of the chain at a 24 to 69 percent margin with 6 to 16 of 17 GPU classes above water in every path; a USD 10 M die fleet holds 50 to 70 percent on landing and takes the chain by year 3 to 5 on flat and shrinking paths (0 of 17 classes above water); a USD 100 M die fleet takes it on landing in every path and runs at a loss.
- The tariff advantage is explicit and separate from the hardware advantage (section 1). The review's 6.25x illustration (a 1.5x chip at 0.06 against a GPU at 0.25) is the first row; on the measured rows the operating advantage is the joule ratio times the tariff ratio (2.2x to 4.5x times 1x to 4.2x for the board, 3.7x to 7.8x for the die), the hardware advantage 1.3x to 4x for the board and 9x to 29x for the die, and the total a third to a half of the operating figure because power is 60 to 70 percent of an owner's cost and 30 to 40 of an entrant's.
- The break-even electricity price is tabled for all 17 classes (section 3). A GPU owner with sunk hardware matches the board at 3 years up to 9 to 15 cents per kWh on Blackwell and 4 to 6 on Ada and Ampere; at 1 year up to 27 to 40 cents; it matches the die at 0 to 5 cents. No GPU ENTRANT matches the board at 3 years or the die at any life at any positive price except the 5070 Ti against the 1-year board (25 cents): the entrant rows are where the GPU side loses first.
- Proving is the second income the chip does not have (section 5). A 16 GB or larger card earns USD 3 to 7 a day from internal proving at IGN 0.10 (the H100 16, the A100 9) against USD 0.2 to 1.7 a day from mining at the GPU equilibrium, and USD 5 to 12 under a proving spike; the SRAM die, the DRAM board, the 9070 XT and the Mac earn nothing from it, and the 12 GB tier earns nothing from internal proving today (measured). A GPU displaced from mining by a chip goes to proving (the operator simulation's D1: 1,500 of 9,177 cards), which is the mechanism that keeps commodity participation when the mining margin is gone.
- Accessible supply and dependence (section 11). At the GPU equilibrium the chain's hash is 5.6 / 9.6 / 20 / 42 TH/s at IGN 0.03 / 0.10 / 0.30 / 1.00, which is 12 / 21 / 44 / 95 percent of the installed base available to mining (44.7 TH/s, approximate) across 16 NVIDIA classes, AMD and Apple; the same hash is 17 / 29 / 60 / 128 N2 wafers from one supplier, or 34,000 to 255,000 DRAM boards. Dependence on a single supplier is total for the die, partial for the board, nil for the GPU side.
- The conditions under which the success statement holds (section 12), each with its number: (a) the chip's all-in cost within about 1.5x of the best GPU owner's at the GPU's electricity; (b) the chip's hardware per MH/s not under about a quarter of the GPU entrant's; (c) a fleet above a third of the chain costing more than a year's miner revenue; (d) GPUs keeping a resale market and a use outside mining; (e) the per-joule gap at the honest knee under about 3x; (f) the supplier's margin a normal return that does not rise with the halvings; (g) a second income (proving) for the commodity side that the specialised supplier cannot enter. The board passes all seven at a 1 to 3 year life; the die fails (a), (b), (c), (e) and (f) at every life, price path and electricity price once it exists. Against the pass line: the board's pass does not need a small network (it holds at 42 TH/s and IGN 1.00), token appreciation (it holds on the flat and shrinking paths) or scheduled ASIC death (its life axis is 1 to 5 years and the 180-day rotation is not what holds it); the die's failure is not cured by any of the three either, and the only condition that holds the die is that nobody pays to build it (the surface: IGN 0.73 for a USD 150 M project at a third of the chain over three years), which is an investor's decision, not a level the chain stays below. The model names where it fails: a sunk SRAM die of USD 10 M or more at any price in the window.
1. The tariff advantage beside the hardware advantage (D4: the electricity axis explicit)
The chip at 0.06 per kWh with farm hosting; the GPU at 0.06, 0.12 and 0.25. "Operating" is joules times tariff; "hardware" the GPU entrant's annualised hardware over the chip's; the total against the existing owner and the entrant.
| Row | Joules ratio | GPU tariff over chip tariff | Operating advantage | Hardware advantage | Total vs owner / entrant | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| The review's illustration: a 1.5x chip at 0.06 against a GPU at 0.25 | 1.5x | 4.17x | 6.25x | n/a | n/a | the review |
| GDDR7 board, 3 y, vs 5070 Ti at 0.06 / 0.12 / 0.25 | 2.2x | 1x / 2x / 4.2x | 2.2x / 4.3x / 9.0x | 1.3x | 0.5x / 1.4x; 0.9x / 1.7x; 1.6x / 2.4x | modelled |
| GDDR7 board, 3 y, vs 5080 | 2.6x | the same | 2.6x / 5.2x / 10.9x | 1.9x | 0.7x / 1.9x; 1.1x / 2.3x; 2.0x / 3.2x | modelled |
| GDDR7 board, 3 y, vs 4090 | 4.5x | 4.5x / 9.1x / 18.9x | 4.0x | 1.2x / 3.8x; 1.9x / 4.6x; 3.5x / 6.2x | modelled | |
| N2 SRAM die, 3 y, vs 5070 Ti | 3.7x | 3.7x / 7.4x / 15.4x | 9.3x | 2.2x / 5.8x; 3.6x / 7.2x; 6.8x / 10.4x | modelled | |
| N2 SRAM die, 3 y, vs 5080 | 4.5x | 4.5x / 9.0x / 18.7x | 13.8x | 2.8x / 8.2x; 4.6x / 9.9x; 8.5x / 13.8x | modelled | |
| N2 SRAM die, 3 y, vs 4090 | 7.8x | 7.8x / 15.6x / 32.4x | 28.7x | 5.0x / 16.4x; 8.1x / 19.5x; 14.8x / 26.2x | modelled |
Reading: the tariff multiplies the operating advantage one for one, as the review says, and the total is a third to a half of it; the board's total against a Blackwell card at its knee is under 1x (owner) to 2.4x (entrant) across the whole axis at 3 years, the coexistence band; the die's 2.2x to 14x is not.
2. Cheap and dear electricity: the GPU population's cost per accepted unit (D4: cheap and dear electricity)
Cost per accepted MH/s-hour (micro-USD; accepted = 97 percent of raw: rejects 0.5, downtime 2.0, epoch preparation and propagation 0.5; pool fee 1 percent). The existing owner (hardware sunk; power, 5 percent wear, fees) and the new entrant (buys new or used, runs two years, resells at the table's fraction).
| Card | Owner at 0.06 / 0.12 / 0.25 | Entrant, new, at 0.06 / 0.12 / 0.25 | Entrant, used | Hardware share of the entrant at 0.12 | Wh per MH/s-hour | Alternative use (rental yield, approximate) | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RTX 5090 | 243 / 388 / 704 | 661 / 807 / 1,122 | 800 / 945 / 1,261 | 64 percent | 2.33 | USD 0.3 to 0.5 an hour, 3x to 5x its mining cost | measured floor |
| RTX 5080 | 204 / 332 / 611 | 588 / 716 / 995 | 650 / 779 / 1,058 | 64 | 2.06 | USD 0.15 to 0.25 an hour | measured floor |
| RTX 5070 Ti | 156 / 263 / 493 | 415 / 521 / 751 | 453 / 560 / 790 | 59 | 1.70 | USD 0.1 to 0.2 an hour | modelled knee |
| RTX 5070 | 175 / 284 / 521 | 515 / 624 / 861 | 558 / 668 / 905 | 65 | 1.75 | modelled knee | |
| RTX 5060 Ti 16 GB | 260 / 407 / 727 | 921 / 1,069 / 1,388 | 956 / 1,104 / 1,423 | 72 | 2.36 | modelled knee | |
| RTX 5060 | 225 / 364 / 663 | 734 / 872 / 1,171 | 768 / 906 / 1,205 | 68 | 2.21 | modelled knee | |
| RTX 4090 | 357 / 580 / 1,065 | 1,181 / 1,405 / 1,890 | 1,163 / 1,387 / 1,872 | 68 | 3.58 | USD 0.3 to 0.4 an hour | modelled knee, stock measured |
| RTX 4080 | 312 / 531 / 1,006 | 1,011 / 1,231 / 1,706 | 879 / 1,099 / 1,574 | 64 | 3.51 | modelled knee | |
| RTX 4070 | 300 / 524 / 1,008 | 854 / 1,078 / 1,562 | 778 / 1,001 / 1,486 | 58 | 3.58 | measured tune | |
| RTX 4060 Ti 16 GB | 336 / 574 / 1,090 | 1,159 / 1,397 / 1,913 | 969 / 1,207 / 1,723 | 66 | 3.81 | modelled knee | |
| RTX 3090 (used) | 384 / 666 / 1,276 | 1,272 / 1,554 / 2,164 | 1,091 / 1,373 / 1,983 | 64 | 4.51 | modelled cap | |
| RTX 3080 (used) | 310 / 573 / 1,141 | 754 / 1,016 / 1,585 | 661 / 923 / 1,492 | 48 | 4.20 | modelled cap | |
| RTX 3060 (used) | 408 / 768 / 1,550 | 847 / 1,208 / 1,989 | 754 / 1,114 / 1,895 | 40 | 5.77 | modelled cap | |
| RX 9070 XT | 657 / 1,151 / 2,220 | 1,617 / 2,111 / 3,180 | 1,668 / 2,162 / 3,231 | 53 | 7.90 | measured | |
| H100 (hosted) | 1,313 / 1,438 / 1,709 | 8,374 / 8,499 / 8,770 | 7,880 / 8,004 / 8,275 | 97 | 2.00 | USD 2 to 3 an hour: never mines | modelled lock |
| A100 (used) | 775 / 955 / 1,346 | 6,615 / 6,796 / 7,187 | 4,388 / 4,568 / 4,960 | 95 | 2.89 | USD 1 an hour: never mines | modelled |
| Apple M5 Max (reported, not headlined) | 789 / 876 / 1,066 | 4,033 / 4,120 / 4,310 | 4,690 / 4,778 / 4,967 | 96 | 1.40 | a workstation: an owner only | measured |
The chip rows, development sunk (the mandatory case), farm hosting USD 0.02 per kWh-equivalent on top:
| Chip | 0.5 y at 0.06 / 0.12 / 0.25 | 1 y | 2 y | 3 y | 5 y | Hardware / power at 0.06, 3 y | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| GDDR7 board with an N5 core | 1,414 / 1,463 / 1,570 | 750 / 799 / 906 | 418 / 467 / 574 | 307 / 356 / 463 | 219 / 268 / 375 | 239 / 65 | modelled |
| HBM3 one stack with a core | 2,123 / 2,164 / 2,252 | 1,104 / 1,145 / 1,233 | 594 / 635 / 723 | 425 / 465 / 553 | 289 / 329 / 417 | 367 / 54 | modelled |
| N2 SRAM die with the core | 226 / 255 / 317 | 134 / 163 / 225 | 87 / 116 / 178 | 72 / 101 / 163 | 60 / 88 / 151 | 33 / 38 | modelled |
| N2 SRAM die at the bare-lane floor | 202 / 212 / 235 | 109 / 120 / 142 | 63 / 73 / 96 | 47 / 58 / 80 | 35 / 45 / 68 | 33 / 14 | modelled, the worst case |
3. Break-even electricity prices for all 17 classes (D4: the output per class)
Cents per kWh at which the GPU's cost per accepted unit equals the chip's all-in at 0.06 per kWh; the OWNER figure (hardware sunk) and the ENTRANT figure (hardware bought); "under 0" means no positive price matches.
| Class | GDDR7 board 1 y: owner / entrant | GDDR7 board 3 y | SRAM die 1 y | SRAM die 3 y |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| RTX 5090 | 27 / 10 | 9 / under 0 | 1.5 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 |
| RTX 5080 | 32 / 14 | 11 / under 0 | 2.7 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 |
| RTX 5070 Ti | 40 / 25 | 15 / 0 | 4.7 / under 0 | 1.2 / under 0 |
| RTX 5070 | 38 / 19 | 13 / under 0 | 3.8 / under 0 | 0.4 / under 0 |
| RTX 5060 Ti 16 GB | 26 / under 0 | 8 / under 0 | 0.9 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 |
| RTX 5060 | 29 / 7 | 10 / under 0 | 2.0 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 |
| RTX 4090 | 17 / under 0 | 5 / under 0 | 0 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 |
| RTX 4080 | 18 / under 0 | 6 / under 0 | 1.1 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 |
| RTX 4070 | 18 / 3 | 6 / under 0 | 1.5 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 |
| RTX 4060 Ti 16 GB | 16 / under 0 | 5 / under 0 | 0.9 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 |
| RTX 3090 (used) | 14 / under 0 | 4 / under 0 | 0.7 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 |
| RTX 3080 (used) | 16 / 6 | 6 / under 0 | 2.0 / under 0 | 0.5 / under 0 |
| RTX 3060 (used) | 12 / 4 | 4 / under 0 | 1.4 / under 0 | 0.4 / under 0 |
| RX 9070 XT | 7 / under 0 | 2 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 |
| H100 (hosted) | under 0 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 |
| A100 (used) | 5 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 |
| Apple M5 Max | 3 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 | under 0 / under 0 |
Reading: the board at 1 year is beaten by every Blackwell owner below 26 to 40 cents and by the 5070 Ti entrant below 25; at 3 years by Blackwell owners below 8 to 15 cents and by no entrant. The die is matched by no entrant and by owners only below 0 to 5 cents. The GPU side's electricity price is the board's whole variable and irrelevant to the die.
4. GPU replacement and resale on both sides, with the generation step on the chip side too (D4)
| Who | Against the DRAM board (bought at twice the hardware term, the manufacturer's half) | Against the SRAM die (bought, the same) | What it means |
|---|---|---|---|
| A Blackwell owner at 0.06 to 0.12 | never switches: the bought board at 3 years is 550 to 600 micro-USD against the owner's 156 to 332 | switches at 0.12 (105 to 134 against 263 to 332); near indifferent at 0.06 | the die replaces Blackwell owners at normal grid prices; the board never does |
| An Ada or Ampere owner at 0.12 | near indifferent at 3 years (550 to 600 against 524 to 768); switches at 0.25 | switches at every price | the board retires only the oldest cards at dear electricity, which the generation does anyway |
| A new entrant choosing between a new 5070 Ti and a bought chip at 0.12 | the board at 3 years (about 600) is 1.15x the card's 521: the card wins; at 1 year the card wins 2x | the bought die (134) is 0.26x the card: the die wins 4x | an entrant market with a bought die has no GPU entrants; one with a bought board keeps them |
| The GPU generation at year 3 (1.5x per joule at the same price, the old card resold at the table's fraction) | cuts the entrant's cost 25 percent and the owner's power 33 percent: the board at 3 years then reads 1.5x to 1.7x the new entrant, in band | the die's advantage falls 25 to 33 percent, from 7x to 5x on the entrant: still out of band | the GPU side's own curve narrows the board's gap by the second generation and never closes the die's |
| The chip's generation at year 3 (a node step, 1.5x per joule, re-bought at the same silicon price) | the board's power term falls a third (65 to 43 micro-USD of 307): 2 percent of its cost; its hardware term is unchanged | the die's 38 to 25: 4 percent of 72 | the chip side's generation moves the totals under 5 percent: the chip's cost is hardware, the GPU's is power, so the generation helps the GPU more |
| Resale | the GPU resells at 25 to 55 percent after two years (section 2); the chips at 0 | the resale market is the GPU entrant's whole hedge and the chip has none, which is why the chip's life is the axis that moves everything (section 7) |
5. Changing proving demand: proving revenue as a second income axis per class (D4: new)
The resolution's shape (the research lane, 17:0x UK): the tip stays whole to the miner; provers are paid the 20 percent pool per block plus an explicit user-funded proving fee with congestion pricing; the burn separate; the hard cap and no development tax kept. The internal pool at IGN 0.10 is USD 27,400 a day (0.2 x 0.77 B / 0.8 / 365), shared by proving capacity (a 5,000-card fleet drawn from the classes that can prove, approximate); external demand USD 2,000 a day at launch (spec 05's grid), 20,000 under a spike, 90 percent to the provers who deliver. The 12 GB tier's internal row is the fleet lane's measured zero (0 paid in 313 claims on Devnet 3, 8 October 2026).
| Class | Memory | Shard s (bench) | Internal proving, USD per card-day | Plus external at launch | Plus external at a 10x spike | Mining at the GPU equilibrium, USD per card-day | Power per day at 0.12 | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| RTX 5090 | 32 | 6.3 | 7.42 | 7.90 | 12.29 | 1.69 | 0.86 | modelled on measured shard times |
| RTX 5080 | 16 | 8.0 | 5.84 | 6.22 | 9.68 | 0.89 | 0.63 | the same |
| RTX 5070 Ti | 16 | 7.0 | 6.67 | 7.11 | 11.06 | 0.96 | 0.58 | the same |
| RTX 5070 | 12 | 4.8 | 0 (measured zero) | 0.64 | 6.40 | 0.51 | 0.40 | measured zero, modelled external |
| RTX 5060 Ti 16 GB | 16 | 11.6 | 4.03 | 4.29 | 6.68 | 0.24 | 0.26 | modelled |
| RTX 5060 | 8 | 12.0 | 0 (measured zero) | 0.26 | 2.56 | 0.21 | 0.23 | |
| RTX 4090 | 24 | 6.3 | 7.42 | 7.90 | 12.29 | 0.73 | 0.81 | |
| RTX 4080 | 16 | 7.5 | 6.23 | 6.64 | 10.33 | 0.56 | 0.63 | |
| RTX 4070 | 12 | 12.1 | 0 (measured zero) | 0.25 | 2.54 | 0.39 | 0.32 | |
| RTX 4060 Ti 16 GB | 16 | 11.6 | 4.03 | 4.29 | 6.68 | 0.22 | 0.22 | |
| RTX 3090 (used) | 24 | 14.9 | 3.14 | 3.34 | 5.20 | 0.47 | 0.66 | |
| RTX 3080 (used) | 10 | 7.1 | 0 (measured zero) | 0.43 | 4.33 | 0.51 | 0.60 | |
| RTX 3060 (used) | 12 | 14.4 | 0 (measured zero) | 0.21 | 2.13 | 0.30 | 0.30 | |
| RX 9070 XT | 16 | none | cannot prove (no CUDA) | 0.24 | 0.43 | |||
| H100 (hosted) | 80 | 3.0 | 15.57 | 16.60 | 25.81 | 1.13 | 1.01 | |
| A100 (used) | 80 | 5.0 | 9.34 | 9.96 | 15.49 | 0.75 | 0.72 | |
| Apple M5 Max | 36 | none | cannot prove | 0.34 | 0.11 | |||
| The SRAM die, the DRAM board, any hash engine | none | 0: a hash engine cannot prove | 0 | 0 | the whole chain's mining | by construction |
Reading: at launch-shape demand a proving-capable card earns 4x to 8x more per day from internal proving than from mining at the GPU equilibrium, and the pool is shared by few enough cards that it pays even at 0.25 per kWh; under a spike the external fee adds 50 to 70 percent. The chip has none of it. At zero proving demand (the pool is a launch subsidy and the external market empty) the second income is 0 and the commodity side falls back to mining alone, which is the first cut's model; at the fleet lane's measured efficiency (5.5 percent of proving card-time paid on a day with a fault) the internal rows are 0.4 to 0.9 USD a day, still above mining for the 24 GB and datacentre classes. The condition this adds to section 12 is (g): a second income for the commodity side that the specialised supplier cannot enter; it holds while proving demand exists and the 16 GB and larger tiers can prove.
6. Private mining and hardware sales; cheaper derivative chips (D4)
From the surface (the floor file 4.4, the mission lane's shape), p* is the break-even price in USD per IGN:
| Entrant | C_dev 20 M (a DRAM board), L 3 y, q 0.3 / 1.0 |
150 M (the SRAM die), 3 y, 0.3 / 1.0 | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|
| The operator self-mining a first design | 0.055 / 0.017 (USD 43 / 13 M a year of miner revenue) | 0.73 / 0.22 (561 / 168 M) | the first entrant self-mines |
| The manufacturer selling hardware (keeps half the profit) | 0.11 / 0.034 | 1.50 / 0.45 | about 2x the operator's bar |
The revision entrant (a second design at 0.3 x C_dev, T0 1 y) |
0.019 / 0.006 | 0.12 / 0.04 | a derivative costs a third and ships a year sooner; the sunk case bounds it |
| The shared-cost entrant (three share one design) | 0.040 / 0.012 | 0.24 / 0.07 | |
| The hybrid (self-mine a year, then sell) | 0.07 | 1.10 | between the two |
| Development SUNK (the mandatory case) | 0: the entrant pays manufacturing, deployment and operation only; its rows are section 2's chip rows | 0 | the whole threat is this case |
With development paid, every chip is ABOVE the best GPU entrant (415 to 588 micro-USD) at IGN 0.10 and below; the die falls below it only from IGN 0.30 on a 3-year life; the board with paid development never does inside the window.
7. Several productive lifetimes (D4)
| Life | GDDR7 board, sunk, at 0.06 (micro-USD) | Against the 5070 Ti owner / entrant | SRAM die, sunk | Against the 5070 Ti owner / entrant | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.5 y (the fixed-lane chip under the 180-day rotation) | 1,414 | 0.1x / 0.3x | 226 | 0.7x / 1.8x | neither chip pays at half a year; the board is 3x worse than a GPU entrant |
| 1 y | 750 | 0.2x / 0.6x | 134 | 1.2x / 3.1x | the board loses to every Blackwell entrant; the die is in band against owners |
| 2 y | 418 | 0.4x / 1.0x | 87 | 1.8x / 4.8x | |
| 3 y (the programmable chip's default) | 307 | 0.5x / 1.4x | 72 | 2.2x / 5.8x | the board's coexistence band; the die out of it |
| 5 y | 219 | 0.7x / 1.9x | 60 | 2.6x / 6.9x |
The rotation (layer 3) sets the fixed-lane chip's life at 0.5 years and does nothing to a programmable chip; its value is the factor between the first and the fourth row, not a wall, and the pass line's "scheduled ASIC death" is not what holds either chip here: the board holds at every life from 1 year on its hardware term, the die holds at none.
8. Growing and shrinking networks, reduced issuance (D4)
Five years with a per-class supply curve (section 9's rule), the emission halving in years 3 and 5, three price paths, a sunk chip fleet entering at the start of year 2. The chip's joules improve 1.5x at year 4 (a node step).
| Path, fleet | Year 2 | Year 3 | Year 5 | GPU classes above water (of 17) | Reading |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Growing x2 from 0.10; a USD 1 M die fleet (1.3 TH/s) | 6 percent of 20 TH/s; margin 92 percent | 5 percent | 3 percent of 39 TH/s | 14, 15, 16 | coexistence by dilution: the supplier earns 90 percent margins on a tiny share; not a normal return, but no class leaves |
| Growing; USD 10 M die (12.8 TH/s) | 50 percent | 43 percent | 30 percent | 12, 13, 15 | half the chain on landing; dilutes to 30 percent by year 4 as GPUs re-enter at the higher price; margins 88 to 93 percent |
| Growing; USD 100 M die (128 TH/s) | 100 percent; margin 49 percent | 100 percent | 99 percent | 0, 0, 4 | failure: one buyer holds the chain for five years; four classes return in year 4 at IGN 0.80 |
| Growing; USD 10 M board (1.8 TH/s) | 9 percent; margin 65 percent | 7 percent | 4.5 percent | 14, 15, 16 | coexistence at a 57 to 69 percent margin |
| Flat 0.10; USD 1 M die | 9 percent | 12 percent | 19 percent of 6.9 TH/s | 12, 11, 6 | the halvings raise the share; six classes left by year 5 |
| Flat; USD 10 M die | 70 percent | 89 percent | 100 percent | 6, 6, 0 | failure by year 5 |
| Flat; USD 100 M die | 100 percent; margin -1 percent | -102 percent | -233 percent | 0 | failure for both: the fleet is larger than the revenue |
| Flat; USD 10 M board | 14 percent; margin 57 percent | 16 percent; 34 | 24 percent; 27 | 12, 11, 6 | coexistence at a normal return (27 to 57 percent) |
| Shrinking x0.5 from 0.30; USD 1 M die | 7 percent | 17 percent | 74 percent of 1.7 TH/s | 13, 11, 2 | failure in year 5 at USD 4 M of revenue |
| Shrinking; USD 10 M die | 58 percent | 96 percent | 100 percent; margin -77 percent | 11, 3, 0 | failure from year 3 |
| Shrinking; USD 10 M board | 10 percent; margin 62 percent | 22 percent; 28 | 91 percent; -30 percent | 13, 8, 2 | the board too takes a shrinking chain at USD 4 M of revenue, and loses money doing it |
Reading: reduced issuance (the halvings) and a shrinking price move every row toward the chip's share, and a USD 1 M die fleet is 74 percent of a USD 4 M chain. The board coexists at a normal return in the growing and flat paths and takes the chain only when the chain is worth less than its fleet; the die's USD 10 M fleet takes the chain on every flat or shrinking path by year 3 to 5. The pass line's "small network": the board's pass holds at 42 TH/s and IGN 1.00 (the growing path's year 4), so it does not need one; the die's failure is worst in a small network, and a large one only delays it.
9. Miners react with no fixed shares (D4: new)
The reaction rule replacing the first cut's single rule: each class participates with a fraction of its base, the third of the base already owned joining as revenue per MH/s-hour rises from its owner cost to its entrant cost (linearly) and the other two thirds entering when revenue exceeds the entrant cost; the installed base is the cap; re-entry on a price rise is automatic (the growing path's year 4: 12.9 to 37.7 TH/s as 16 of 17 classes come back); the chip fleet is fixed after entry. The equilibrium revenue per MH/s-hour and the GPU hash are solved each year by bisection. Against the single-rule first cut the shares move: the USD 10 M die fleet holds 50 percent on landing in the growing path (the first cut read 37) and 70 percent on the flat path (73), and the board holds 9 to 24 percent (10 to 31): the per-class curve lets the cheaper classes stay longer and the dearer ones leave sooner, and the totals are within 5 points of the first cut. The operator simulation carries the same reaction at a one-day step with proving as a third choice; its D1 shock (a 1 TH/s die fleet) moves 1,500 of 9,177 mining cards to proving.
10. The operator simulation (D4 item 2, beside this model)
docs/analysis/class-v6/operator-simulation.md: operators choose per day among mine, internal prove, external prove
and off by profit at the marginal rate, under four shocks. At launch-shape demand every shock is restored in 0
periods (idle GPU capacity dwarfs the proving work). In a capacity-limited world (1 percent of the cards, the measured
5.5 percent proving efficiency) a lasting 1,000x proving spike is NOT restored within 150 periods when the internal
pool is a fixed sum (provers go to the external fee market and the internal backlog grows without bound) and is
restored in 35 periods with the resolution's congestion-priced internal proving fee; the price fall, the departure of
the six largest proving cohorts, the mining entrant and the proving entrant are restored in 0 periods in both worlds.
No parameter was changed by hand in any run. The one design finding: the fixed pool is a subsidy, not a price, and
internal proving needs the congestion-priced fee the resolution gives it.
11. Accessible supply, and the dependence on suppliers and operators (D4: its own table)
| IGN price | Network hash at the GPU equilibrium (per-class curve) | Share of the installed base available to mining (44.7 TH/s, approximate) | GPU suppliers | In N2 SRAM dies / wafers from ONE supplier | In DRAM boards | The largest single GPU operator today (a 1 percent fleet) | Label |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 0.03 | 5.6 TH/s | 12 percent | NVIDIA (16 of 17 classes), AMD, Apple; tens of millions of cards in the world | 1,000 dies / 17 wafers | 34,000 | 0.06 TH/s | modelled |
| 0.10 | 9.6 | 21 | the same | 1,700 / 29 | 58,000 | 0.10 | modelled |
| 0.30 | 20 | 44 | the same | 3,600 / 60 | 119,000 | 0.20 | modelled |
| 1.00 | 42 | 95 | the same; past this the installed base binds and used prices rise | 7,700 / 128 | 255,000 | 0.42 | modelled |
The GPU side has three suppliers, a used market, a use outside mining (the rental yields of section 2) and no operator above a percent of the hash; the die's whole chain is one wafer allocation (17 to 128 wafers of a node booked to 2028, claimed) and the board's a Bitmain-class run of 34,000 to 255,000 units with a commodity memory bill. Dependence on a single supplier: total for the die at every price, partial for the board (a run that size is visible and takes months), nil for the GPU side; dependence on a single operator: a chip fleet is one operator by construction (the operator simulation's D1), a GPU fleet of the same hash is tens of thousands of owners.
12. The conditions under which the success statement holds (the result)
| Condition | The number on today's rows | DRAM board | SRAM die |
|---|---|---|---|
| (a) the chip's all-in cost per accepted unit at its own electricity within about 1.5x of the best GPU owner's at the GPU's electricity | the owner at 0.12: 263 to 332 micro-USD (5070 Ti, 5080) | 307 at 3 y, 750 at 1 y: PASSES | 72 to 134: FAILS at every life |
| (b) the chip's annualised hardware per MH/s not below about a quarter of the GPU entrant's | the 5080 entrant's hardware 460 micro-USD | 239 to 677: PASSES | 33 to 95: FAILS |
| (c) a fleet above a third of the chain's hash costs more than a year's miner revenue | at IGN 0.10 the chain is 9.6 TH/s, a third 3.2 | USD 18 M of boards against USD 40 to 80 M: PASSES above IGN 0.05 | USD 2.5 M of dies: FAILS at every price under about 3 |
| (d) GPUs keep a resale market and a use outside mining | resale 25 to 55 percent after two years; rental 3x to 5x the mining cost | PASSES (the GPU side's property) | PASSES (the same) |
| (e) the per-joule gap at the honest knee stays under about 3x | Blackwell at the knee 1.70 to 2.06 microjoules | 2.2x to 2.6x: PASSES | 3.7x to 4.5x: FAILS (the bare-lane floor 10x to 12x) |
| (f) the supplier's gross margin is a normal return (under about 70 percent) and does not rise with the halvings | section 8 | 27 to 69 percent, falling with the halvings: PASSES | 85 to 93 percent, rising, or a loss once it is the chain: FAILS |
| (g) a second income (proving) for the commodity side that the specialised supplier cannot enter | section 5: USD 3 to 7 a card-day at launch demand on the 16 GB and larger tiers; 0 for any hash engine | PASSES (the board cannot prove either, which is the GPU's advantage over it) | PASSES (the same) |
The result. The success statement holds for the stored-dataset DRAM-board chip at a 1 to 3 year life on today's rows, in every price path, at every electricity price on the axis, with the GPU side's own generation curve narrowing the gap further and proving as a second income the chip cannot enter; its pass needs no small network (it holds at 42 TH/s and IGN 1.00), no token appreciation (it holds on the flat and shrinking paths) and no scheduled ASIC death (the life axis, not the rotation, is what the board lives on). The statement does not hold for the N2 SRAM die once that die exists with its development sunk, at any life, price path or electricity price; a small network makes it worse, appreciation only delays it, and the rotation does not touch a programmable die. The model names where it fails: a sunk SRAM die fleet of USD 10 M or more at any price in the window, and of USD 1 M in a shrinking chain. The only condition that holds the die is that nobody pays to build it (section 6: IGN 0.73 for a USD 150 M project at a third of the chain over three years, 0.22 taking the chain, 0.12 to 0.16 for a revision), which is a statement about an investor's decision and is carried as such, not as a level the chain stays below.
What the chain controls, from the model: the honest side's cost per accepted unit (every cent of GPU electricity and every point of the knee moves (a) and (e); the lock already moves a Blackwell card 34 to 41 percent), the second income (proving demand and the congestion-priced fee that keeps internal proving served, the operator simulation's finding), the share detector that makes (c) visible the week it fails, and the dataset floor as the ticket (USD 1,500 to 3,000 per die at the schedule, which moves (c) by 2x to 4x and nothing else). Nothing in the hash moves (a), (b) or (e) for the die by the factor they need.
13. The D4 checklist, line by line
| Item | Where | Status |
|---|---|---|
| Growing and shrinking networks | section 8 | in |
| Reduced issuance | section 8 (the halvings in years 3 and 5) | in |
| Cheap and dear electricity | sections 1 to 3 | in |
| GPU replacement and resale on both sides, the 1.5x generation on the chip side too | section 4 | in |
| Changing proving demand | section 5 (zero, launch, spike; the resolution's shape; the 12 GB measured zero) | in |
| Private mining and hardware sales | section 6 | in |
| Several productive lifetimes (0.5, 1, 2, 3, 5) | section 7 | in |
| Cheaper derivative chips | section 6 (the revision and shared-cost rows) | in |
| Miners react with no fixed shares (per-class supply curve, installed base cap, re-entry) | section 9 | in |
| The outputs: cost advantage, replacement economics, accessible supply, break-even electricity per class (17), supplier and operator dependence as its own table | sections 1, 4, 11, 3, 11 | in |
| The tariff advantage shown separately from the hardware advantage, the 6.25x illustration first | section 1 | in |
| The operator simulation | section 10 and its own file | in (first run) |
| The k lane's placed rows and the adversary lane's whole-machine rows | the chip rows stand until they land | owed by others |
| Per-card agents, the hybrid mode, the measured stage times in the simulation | the simulation's section 4 | second cut |
14. Unverified and owed
- Every chip-side figure is modelled; no chip has been measured. The chip's hardware per MH/s (USD 0.8 for the die with the system, 5.6 for the board) is the term conditions (b) and (c) rest on and is approximate within 2x.
- The card prices are street approximations of October 2026; the installed-base counts available to mining are approximate (the cap of 44.7 TH/s); the 5090's street price has been 2x MSRP this year.
- The Ada and Ampere knees are modelled (no rented host allows the lock); the Blackwell floors are measured on the 5090, 5080 and 4070.
- The proving rows rest on the bench table's shard times and the fleet lane's one measured day (with a fault); the proving fleet (5,000 cards) and the pool sharing by capacity are assumptions.
- The accepted-work factor, the wear allowance, the hosting and the rental yields are approximate.
- The emission beyond year 5 and the proving pool's fade are outside the run.
- Nothing was run on the Mac; the scripts ran on build-3 (first cut) and build-4 (this cut).