Spec 2.3: rule 1 measures every chain step on a sanitised clock stored per header
(c(b) = max(c(p) + clamp(t(b) - c(p), -20 T, +20 T), t(b) - 60 T), step min(c(b) - c(p),
20 T)); rule 4 bounds the output to [2^128, MAX_DIFFICULTY_TARGET]; the timestamp rules
are Igneum's own, 10 s ahead of the clock and 10 s behind the selected parent beside the
unchanged past-median rule; new parameter rows, the bounds paragraph rewritten (the old
"next honest block cancels it" was the attack), the attack and test-network results added.
sim/difficulty/sim.py: class Igneum carries the same clock, lag bound and floor, so the
rule as simulated is the rule as coded (attacks.py's igneum-san is now identical to it).
docs/analysis/difficulty-2026-10-03.md section 11: the attack, the three parts, before and
after tables (simulator seeds 7 to 9, base-profile regression within 10% on the 3-seed
means, pool hopping unchanged, the two 15-minute 3-node forger runs), unit tests, limits.
docs/bench-log.md: the 4 October entry. docs/fud-ledger.md: M23, status Fixed.
Node side: vendor/igneum-node branch difficulty, commit 52eacad9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
No per-job growth in any worker or in the miner's memory. The STATUS rates are cumulative averages
(a fast first interval decays by construction), and the miner's Seeder walks the selected chain from
the sink to the epoch start on every memo miss (one getBlock per block, up to 3,600), a gap between
jobs that grew 0.10 s to 0.33 s across epoch 2 on the PC and reset at the epoch boundary while the
difficulty held. Reproduced on the Metal worker (churn on, off, on). One versus eight workers at two
fixed difficulties: 4% and 1% constant cost, no decay. Fix as a unified diff, not applied.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
sim/economy/sim.py: 1,000 operators choosing MINE, PROVE, HYBRID or OFF per card class with their own clients; sortition by weight with the 10-s window then open claiming, external jobs with the 90/10 split, backlog rule, difficulty clamps, GBM price. Scenarios a to f, 5 seeds: no backlog, no window miss, hash floor 0.74 of pre-event. Traffic sensitivity finds the shortage oscillation only above the proving fleet's capacity (100 to 300 shards per block); at 100 the sortition window (10 s to 20 s) is the lever that removes it. docs/analysis/economy-2026-10-04.md holds the model, assumptions, results, worst case and the proposal (window = p90 shard time plus a swap, 25 s at today's targets; B_p tied to the live fleet), not applied.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docs/evidence.md and site/evidence.html: 28 public claims with one of five status labels (7 designed, 3 implemented, 18 tested by the team, 0 reproduced externally, 0 reviewed independently), version or commit, the reproducible test, the result with date and machine, and independent verification (none yet for every row). Evidence link in the homepage nav and the generated pages' nav.
docs/benchmarks/proving-e2e.md: replaces the 20-second shard gate with three fixed workloads, job-received-to-accepted-proof latency, cost per proof, the eligible card list with mining and proving reported separately, the verbatim acceptance standard and the three-unrelated-operator protocol.
docs/plans/funding.md: cost, what is funded (founder's means, the client's 1% fee once there is mining), what waits on revenue, what pauses.
docs/analysis/security-budget.md: emission through six halvings at three price inputs, miners and provers separate from burns, the USD 1M floor and the year it is crossed.
docs/design/payment-routes.md: Mermaid flowchart and table of every flow, with operator, app, team and protocol revenue labelled.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
