tools/finality-attacks: run.mjs drives a private igneum-devnet-800 network (ports 27800+,
/tmp/igneum-fin-attacks, skip_proof_of_work) with the test-only hostile flags of igneum-miner
(vmine, --equivocate, --sybil, --drop-votes, --pulse, fin-rpc-attack; worktree fin-attacks on
master c6d47547..2a00ff55). Seven scenarios in priority order 3,2,1,6,4,8,5 with a spec 03
criterion and a measured result each; README carries the catalogue, what needs a finality-aware
p2p probe, and a proposed diff for every FAIL.
Results (six voters): S3 dishonest aggregators PASS (35/35/35 locks, 0 conflicts, 1,018 ms);
S2 Sybil dust: weights PASS, aggregator sortition FAIL (per key, ledger F17); S1 equivocation
PASS (2/2/2 stripped, 0 conflicts); S6A 3/3 partition FAIL (floor is time-bounded, one side
crossed 56.7% at 84 s of a 90 s split, T* = 2F/13R, 9.2 days for a 50/50 split at mainnet
scale); S6B 4/2 PASS; S4 vote-dropping producer PASS (0 ms added); S8 malformed votes over
RPC PASS (9 cases, no crash); S5 pulse: no retarget amplification (ratio 0.999) PASS,
lock-alone FAIL (a 20 s burst locked checkpoints 1 to 10 alone on a young window, ledger F1,
spec 3.8 not implemented). S7 eclipse not run.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
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