The sweep (main's item 1): 199 tracked text files, 783 lines. The founder's full name, first name and possessive become "the founder" (sentence starts capitalised); the lowercase operating-system user name in WSL paths and commands becomes <user>; the second owner login becomes "the second owner login"; the three earlier businesses and the two other brands become "the other business", "the earlier entity", "the earlier business" and "another brand"; the Chrome profile rule names the igneum.network profile, not the profile's label. The standing commit login igneum-labs is not a founder term here: the fresh-repository step renames it in the history (docs/plans/history-rewrite.md, tools/repo/fresh-repo.sh).
The patterns never appear in plain text in the tree (a plaintext list would be the hit): tools/ci/founder-strings.b64 (perl regex, tab, a sample per row) is read by tools/ci/founder-strings-check.sh (every tracked text file, perl, known-failed first: the self-test plants each row's sample in a fixture and the hit must name the file), by tools/community/discord-hooks.mjs (the guard's founder and business rows; the test takes its fixtures from the samples) and by tools/repo/fresh-repo.sh (the business names of the rewrite rules). site/forbidden-strings.txt carries the same patterns as b64: lines, decoded case-insensitive by site/scrub.mjs and tools/ci/launch-gates-check.mjs (whose fixture now plants an encoded made-up name). The check runs in the gate's tree checks on every merge.
Not in this commit, by main's word: the 105 commit messages and 40 personal-identity commits that need the history rewrite (listed, not run), and the secrets found by gitleaks over the history (reported with owners).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
docs/analysis/51-percent.md: what a 51 percent attacker can and cannot do on Igneum, with
numbers (the selected-chain race over a 90-s hold, the lock as the reorder bound, the veto
at 1/3 of weight and its rental cost, the departure case and the LEAVE item, the p2p surface).
docs/analysis/horizon/consensus-security.md: the attack catalogue across GHOSTDAG ordering,
the difficulty rule, the finality weight, miner signalling, proof records, the exec layer and
p2p, each with the bound and the rental cost at the measured USD 11.7 per GH/s-hour; the
pruned-node unwrap class with its sibling list in the sync and IBD flows; fourteen ranked
defences, three of them not recommended with the reason.
Models and results: sim/horizon/consensus-security/ (ghostdag_sim.py, finality_horizon.py,
cost_model.py, signalling.py, result files).
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
