Spec 2.3: rule 1 measures every chain step on a sanitised clock stored per header
(c(b) = max(c(p) + clamp(t(b) - c(p), -20 T, +20 T), t(b) - 60 T), step min(c(b) - c(p),
20 T)); rule 4 bounds the output to [2^128, MAX_DIFFICULTY_TARGET]; the timestamp rules
are Igneum's own, 10 s ahead of the clock and 10 s behind the selected parent beside the
unchanged past-median rule; new parameter rows, the bounds paragraph rewritten (the old
"next honest block cancels it" was the attack), the attack and test-network results added.
sim/difficulty/sim.py: class Igneum carries the same clock, lag bound and floor, so the
rule as simulated is the rule as coded (attacks.py's igneum-san is now identical to it).
docs/analysis/difficulty-2026-10-03.md section 11: the attack, the three parts, before and
after tables (simulator seeds 7 to 9, base-profile regression within 10% on the 3-seed
means, pool hopping unchanged, the two 15-minute 3-node forger runs), unit tests, limits.
docs/bench-log.md: the 4 October entry. docs/fud-ledger.md: M23, status Fixed.
Node side: vendor/igneum-node branch difficulty, commit 52eacad9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Simulator harness over sim/difficulty/sim.py with multi-miner attribution and in-rule timestamp forging, a 3-node CPU test network (ports 27700+), results and bench-log entry. Timestamp stretching inside Kaspa's rules drops the Igneum block rate 34 to 88% (the per-step clamp cancels forged and honest pairs to zero time); proposed 10 s timestamp bounds plus a sanitised running clock in the chain steps (+0.7% to +1.1% drift at 50% in the simulator). Block flood underflows the 192-bit work after 4,142 blocks; a 2^128 target floor proposed. Rule not changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
sim/economy/sim.py: 1,000 operators choosing MINE, PROVE, HYBRID or OFF per card class with their own clients; sortition by weight with the 10-s window then open claiming, external jobs with the 90/10 split, backlog rule, difficulty clamps, GBM price. Scenarios a to f, 5 seeds: no backlog, no window miss, hash floor 0.74 of pre-event. Traffic sensitivity finds the shortage oscillation only above the proving fleet's capacity (100 to 300 shards per block); at 100 the sortition window (10 s to 20 s) is the lever that removes it. docs/analysis/economy-2026-10-04.md holds the model, assumptions, results, worst case and the proposal (window = p90 shard time plus a swap, 25 s at today's targets; B_p tied to the live fleet), not applied.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Safety: X = 1/3 of total weight while honest votes reach every honest node within 41 min of median time; 4/30 = 13.3% across a longer partition, because only the 17/30 floor binds then (2 x 17/30 - 1). Liveness: Y = 17/30 connected and signing, T = P (1 - Y/(2(1 - Y))) + 107 s, 107 s at 2/3, 43 min at 17/30; below the floor finality pauses and the node reports it. Two certificates at one index: no verified lock is ever withdrawn, operators resolve (replaces the 3.5 re-evaluation). Seeds: uncertified checkpoint allowed (O-4.3 decided). Scenarios H (equivocator across a 50/50 split: conflicts at 12 to 16 min with 20%, none at 13%), I (40/40/20), J (signing stops 1, 6, 24 h), K (bought keys worth 20% and 40% against 30% hash), five seeds each. 3.10 rows for the gaps; open items O-3.15 to O-3.19.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
