Spec 2.3: rule 1 measures every chain step on a sanitised clock stored per header
(c(b) = max(c(p) + clamp(t(b) - c(p), -20 T, +20 T), t(b) - 60 T), step min(c(b) - c(p),
20 T)); rule 4 bounds the output to [2^128, MAX_DIFFICULTY_TARGET]; the timestamp rules
are Igneum's own, 10 s ahead of the clock and 10 s behind the selected parent beside the
unchanged past-median rule; new parameter rows, the bounds paragraph rewritten (the old
"next honest block cancels it" was the attack), the attack and test-network results added.
sim/difficulty/sim.py: class Igneum carries the same clock, lag bound and floor, so the
rule as simulated is the rule as coded (attacks.py's igneum-san is now identical to it).
docs/analysis/difficulty-2026-10-03.md section 11: the attack, the three parts, before and
after tables (simulator seeds 7 to 9, base-profile regression within 10% on the 3-seed
means, pool hopping unchanged, the two 15-minute 3-node forger runs), unit tests, limits.
docs/bench-log.md: the 4 October entry. docs/fud-ledger.md: M23, status Fixed.
Node side: vendor/igneum-node branch difficulty, commit 52eacad9.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Simulator harness over sim/difficulty/sim.py with multi-miner attribution and in-rule timestamp forging, a 3-node CPU test network (ports 27700+), results and bench-log entry. Timestamp stretching inside Kaspa's rules drops the Igneum block rate 34 to 88% (the per-step clamp cancels forged and honest pairs to zero time); proposed 10 s timestamp bounds plus a sanitised running clock in the chain steps (+0.7% to +1.1% drift at 50% in the simulator). Block flood underflows the 192-bit work after 4,142 blocks; a 2^128 target floor proposed. Rule not changed.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
