Commit graph

5 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
igneum-labs
223d073fa9 Ledger close round 2: X14 signing concentration from block payloads; X5 observer columns on a branch (O-X.1)
X14: the signing half. No RPC exposes a certificate's signer set, so
tools/finality-attacks/x14-concentration.mjs now walks the selected
chain over the window, decodes the coinbase finality section (IGNF
trailer: votes, certificates, evidence, the IGNK reveal), rebuilds the
canonical voter list at every checkpoint from headers the way the node's
compute_weights does, and maps every bitmap through it. Read-only on the
Mac observer node under the run lock, node version and DAA recorded,
two readings kept (the window straddles the 0.3.10 restart). Result at
23:00:44 UTC, DAA 138,542: signed weight over the heaviest certificate
per index, 27 keys, top-1 10.0%, top-3 29.1%, top-10 77.3%; hashing
6.4/19.2/60.1, aggregation 44.9/84.1/100, proving 100/100/100. Checks:
240 of 240 rebuilt voter lists equal the node's count, 194 of 194
certificates mapped, 27 reveals against BLAKE2b with 0 mismatches.
Status moved to Answered with evidence for all four; the old status
kept after "Was:". Bench-log entry appended.

X5 (paragraph only; Status stays Decision owner: the project lead): the observer
columns of O-X.1 on this branch, not deployed, the running observer
untouched: live_peer_asn (offline prefix table, no third-party lookup),
live_key_machines (machine fingerprint per vote key from the log
intake), live_pool_statements (signed JSON {pool, keys[], signed_at},
Ed25519, parser and verifier), live_concentration (nightly top-1/3/10
for the four concentrations plus N_ind labelled "proposed definition").
Pure functions in tools/observer/lib/concentration.mjs and
lib/nightly.mjs; keyed BLAKE2b in tools/finality-attacks/lib/blake2b.mjs;
9 node:test tests, all passing.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 23:07:00 +00:00
igneum-labs
22aa692779 Round-4 consensus items: the fud.mjs runner (digest, ban, reorg scenarios on the fast-time 3-node network, ports 29400+), per-node override files and --equivocate-at in the harness, spec 02 section 2.8, spec 03 C1/C4/3.6 and the 3.10 rows, spec 08 section 8.7
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-04 23:53:35 +00:00
igneum-labs
2bb0728eb2 Finality rule v3 (ledger F21, F22): simulator scenario M, spec 03 Q4/Q5, cloud vote-timing analysis, v3 harness runner, fast-time profile, bench-log entry, devnet rollout plan
Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-04 20:04:12 +00:00
igneum-labs
6b72c3b3e6 Fast time: the devnet at 60x for test networks (override-60x.json, --fast-time in both harnesses, proof script)
infra/fast-time/override-60x.json is the devnet with every clock-like consensus parameter divided by 60 and every
block count unchanged (finality window, ban and min_daa 120 DAA; merge depth 60; Kaspa finality depth 720; pruning
depth at the anticone bound 13,838; coinbase maturity 2; the hourly program epoch 60 blocks with a 10-block lead;
the dataset day 24 minutes). The epoch length, lead and day are consensus parameters of the node since devnet-v4
a5ef8b07, carried by the override file. README lists each field, why it scales or not, the flags and the numbers.

Measured (simnet.mjs, three devnet-v4 nodes, three vmine voters at 1 block/s, one real-hash CPU miner): next
epoch seed in the template at 56.1 s, program swap at 65.1 s wall (DAA 60), first finality lock at 185.5 s wall
(checkpoint 5, DAA 149). Both harnesses take --fast-time: finality-attacks s3 PASS in 113 s wall with 16 locks
per node (the devnet rule needs 20 min of warm-up at 6 blocks/s before any lock); harness s3 partition and heal
43 s wall for three cuts against 983 s for four on the devnet profile with the same binary. Bench-log entry.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-04 10:34:19 +00:00
igneum-labs
5962a655c1 Finality attacks: hostile test network of our own nodes, seven scenarios, bench-log entry
tools/finality-attacks: run.mjs drives a private igneum-devnet-800 network (ports 27800+,
/tmp/igneum-fin-attacks, skip_proof_of_work) with the test-only hostile flags of igneum-miner
(vmine, --equivocate, --sybil, --drop-votes, --pulse, fin-rpc-attack; worktree fin-attacks on
master c6d47547..2a00ff55). Seven scenarios in priority order 3,2,1,6,4,8,5 with a spec 03
criterion and a measured result each; README carries the catalogue, what needs a finality-aware
p2p probe, and a proposed diff for every FAIL.

Results (six voters): S3 dishonest aggregators PASS (35/35/35 locks, 0 conflicts, 1,018 ms);
S2 Sybil dust: weights PASS, aggregator sortition FAIL (per key, ledger F17); S1 equivocation
PASS (2/2/2 stripped, 0 conflicts); S6A 3/3 partition FAIL (floor is time-bounded, one side
crossed 56.7% at 84 s of a 90 s split, T* = 2F/13R, 9.2 days for a 50/50 split at mainnet
scale); S6B 4/2 PASS; S4 vote-dropping producer PASS (0 ms added); S8 malformed votes over
RPC PASS (9 cases, no crash); S5 pulse: no retarget amplification (ratio 0.999) PASS,
lock-alone FAIL (a 20 s burst locked checkpoints 1 to 10 alone on a young window, ledger F1,
spec 3.8 not implemented). S7 eclipse not run.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-03 23:50:02 +00:00