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2 commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
igneum-labs
7eed16a29a Pre-public scrub, the text pass (7 October 2026, 19:5x UK): no founder name, personal login, earlier business or personal address in any tracked text file, and a gate check that keeps it so
The sweep (main's item 1): 199 tracked text files, 783 lines. The founder's full name, first name and possessive become "the founder" (sentence starts capitalised); the lowercase operating-system user name in WSL paths and commands becomes <user>; the second owner login becomes "the second owner login"; the three earlier businesses and the two other brands become "the other business", "the earlier entity", "the earlier business" and "another brand"; the Chrome profile rule names the igneum.network profile, not the profile's label. The standing commit login igneum-labs is not a founder term here: the fresh-repository step renames it in the history (docs/plans/history-rewrite.md, tools/repo/fresh-repo.sh).

The patterns never appear in plain text in the tree (a plaintext list would be the hit): tools/ci/founder-strings.b64 (perl regex, tab, a sample per row) is read by tools/ci/founder-strings-check.sh (every tracked text file, perl, known-failed first: the self-test plants each row's sample in a fixture and the hit must name the file), by tools/community/discord-hooks.mjs (the guard's founder and business rows; the test takes its fixtures from the samples) and by tools/repo/fresh-repo.sh (the business names of the rewrite rules). site/forbidden-strings.txt carries the same patterns as b64: lines, decoded case-insensitive by site/scrub.mjs and tools/ci/launch-gates-check.mjs (whose fixture now plants an encoded made-up name). The check runs in the gate's tree checks on every merge.

Not in this commit, by main's word: the 105 commit messages and 40 personal-identity commits that need the history rewrite (listed, not run), and the secrets found by gitleaks over the history (reported with owners).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-07 18:39:50 +00:00
igneum-labs
addeb660fd Key custody: inventory, encrypted backup and restore, no-secrets CI check
docs/security/keys.md: every key the project depends on (the folder, the gh
keyring, the Vercel env of three projects, the GitHub secrets) with where it
lives, what it unlocks, the blast radius lost and leaked, who rotates it and
the rotation status, written from the files and the scripts that read them.
No value, no private fingerprint. Section 4: the second OTA signing key kept
offline, the app change (a key list plus revocation in the manifest), 0.3.9
as the carrier, and the emergency path if the one key leaks today (a manifest
signed with a new key is useless to 0.3.x apps; the mitigation in order).

tools/keys/backup.sh: ~/Desktop/igneum-keys-<date>.dmg, AES-256, hdiutil's
own prompt (never argv, history or a file), the folder minus build-slots,
dlsite-dir and pytools/, plus a README; attached read-only, every file
compared by sha256, listed, detached. --dry-run lists. restore.sh: --check
compares the image against the live folder without printing values, --to
copies back with 0600/0644 and 0700. test-backup.sh: the end-to-end test on a
scratch folder with a throwaway passphrase, 8 steps, passed.

tools/ci/no-secrets-check.sh, in ci.yml: no tracked file named like a key of
~/.config/igneum, no 64-hex value assigned to a token/key/secret name outside
tests and the allowlist (the OTA public key, the published Hardhat and Anvil
accounts); a --self-test fires on a known-bad tree first. 776 files, 0 hits.

Also: ~/.config/igneum, vercel/ and txgen/ are 0700 now (were 0755).

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-10-05 17:01:01 +00:00