From a4c9958cc8e6191bcc6c1937c3a321dfb0662940 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: igneum-labs <337424239+igneum-labs@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 8 Oct 2026 18:45:41 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Open pool: the share's claimed key, its header's key and its
 coinbase reveal are one key or the share is refused before its PoW
 (sidechain::check_key, called in accept; known-pass make_share, known-fail
 the claim, the header and a foreign reveal); suite 30 of 30 on build-2

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5.1 <noreply@anthropic.com>
---
 pool/src/open.rs      |  4 +++-
 pool/src/sidechain.rs | 49 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 2 files changed, 52 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/pool/src/open.rs b/pool/src/open.rs
index e8e630210..4c44571ce 100644
--- a/pool/src/open.rs
+++ b/pool/src/open.rs
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
 //! fee-neutral and the choice is about variance alone (reinvent 3.5).
 
 use crate::pool::{Member, Pool};
-use crate::sidechain::{check_pow, ChainParams, SeedsWire, Share, ShareChain, GENESIS_PARENT};
+use crate::sidechain::{check_key, check_pow, ChainParams, SeedsWire, Share, ShareChain, GENESIS_PARENT};
 use crate::state::{unix_ms, BlockRec, State};
 use crate::verify::JobKey;
 use kaspa_consensus_core::block::Block;
@@ -318,6 +318,8 @@ impl Open {
         if wire != seeds {
             return Err(format!("the share's day {} is not the day of its timestamp ({})", wire.day, seeds.day));
         }
+        // Igneum 2.0: the claimed key, the header's key and the reveal are one key, before the PoW
+        crate::sidechain::check_key(&share)?;
         check_pow(&self.engine, &share)?;
         let share = Arc::new(share);
         let tip = {
diff --git a/pool/src/sidechain.rs b/pool/src/sidechain.rs
index ba24d449b..613d149c8 100644
--- a/pool/src/sidechain.rs
+++ b/pool/src/sidechain.rs
@@ -436,6 +436,25 @@ impl ShareChain {
 }
 
 /// The PoW of a share: the lane hash under the share's seeds equals the claim and meets the share's target.
+/// Igneum 2.0, the vote-key commitment on the open pool (`docs/design/pool-vote-key-commitment.md` 2.2 item 3 and 5.3
+/// item 2): the key a share claims (`key_hash`), the key its header names (`vote_key_hash`, under proof of work) and,
+/// when its coinbase carries a reveal (`IGNK`), the reveal's key are one key, or the share is refused before its PoW is
+/// evaluated. A daemon that stamps another identity into a member's template fails here on every honest daemon.
+pub fn check_key(s: &Share) -> Result<(), String> {
+    let claimed: Hash = s.key_hash.parse().map_err(|_| format!("key_hash {} is not a hash", s.key_hash))?;
+    let header_key = s.raw.header.vote_key_hash;
+    if claimed != header_key {
+        return Err(format!("the share claims key {} but its header names {header_key}", s.key_hash));
+    }
+    if let Some(cb) = s.raw.transactions.first()
+        && let Some(reveal) = KeyReveal::find_in(&cb.payload)
+        && reveal.key_hash() != header_key
+    {
+        return Err(format!("the coinbase reveals key {} but the header names {header_key}", reveal.key_hash()));
+    }
+    Ok(())
+}
+
 pub fn check_pow(engine: &IgneumEngine, s: &Share) -> Result<(), String> {
     let seeds = s.seeds.to_seeds()?;
     let block: Block = s.raw.clone().try_into().map_err(|e| format!("block convert: {e}"))?;
@@ -583,6 +602,36 @@ pub mod tests {
         }
     }
 
+    /// Igneum 2.0: the key a share claims, the key its header names and the key its coinbase reveals are one key.
+    /// Known-pass: make_share. Known-fail: the claim swapped, the header's key swapped (the PoW still over the old
+    /// header, so check_key fires before check_pow would), and a foreign reveal in the coinbase.
+    #[test]
+    fn a_share_whose_keys_disagree_is_refused_before_its_pow() {
+        let engine = IgneumEngine::new();
+        let mut chain = ShareChain::new(params());
+        chain.genesis_target = Some(u64::MAX >> 6);
+        let good = make_share(&chain, &engine, GENESIS_PARENT, "ma", [0xaa; 20], 1_000_000, 0);
+        assert!(check_key(&good).is_ok(), "known-pass");
+        let mut claim = good.clone();
+        claim.key_hash = Hash::from_bytes([9u8; 32]).to_string();
+        assert!(check_key(&claim).unwrap_err().contains("claims key"), "known-fail: the claim");
+        let mut header = good.clone();
+        header.raw.header.vote_key_hash = Hash::from_bytes([9u8; 32]);
+        assert!(check_key(&header).unwrap_err().contains("header names"), "known-fail: the header");
+        let mut reveal = good.clone();
+        let other = kaspa_consensus_core::finality::VoteSecretKey::from_label("mb").key_reveal();
+        let mut payload = reveal.raw.transactions[0].payload.clone();
+        // the reveal in the payload is IGNK || pubkey || pop (scheme 0): overwrite it in place with the other key's
+        let tag = kaspa_consensus_core::finality::KEY_REVEAL_TAG;
+        let at = payload.windows(4).position(|w| w == tag).expect("the test share carries a reveal");
+        let mine = good.raw.transactions[0].payload[at..].to_vec();
+        let theirs = other.to_extra_data();
+        assert_eq!(mine.len() >= theirs.len(), true);
+        payload[at..at + theirs.len()].copy_from_slice(&theirs);
+        reveal.raw.transactions[0].payload = payload;
+        assert!(check_key(&reveal).unwrap_err().contains("reveals key"), "known-fail: a foreign reveal");
+    }
+
     /// A chain of shares by three members: every share passes the structure check and the PoW check, the window's
     /// split is the members' work plus the dev entry and sums to one, the retarget moves toward the share interval,
     /// a withheld share is in nobody's window, and a share off the heavier branch is stale.