diff --git a/docs/analysis/horizon-2026-10.md b/docs/analysis/horizon-2026-10.md index 73e361733..e64b6c9eb 100644 --- a/docs/analysis/horizon-2026-10.md +++ b/docs/analysis/horizon-2026-10.md @@ -43,6 +43,53 @@ Closed 6 October 2026, 22:3x UK, every lane landed. **Decisions owed from the project lead:** the cryptanalysis spend (USD 80,000 to 160,000); the testnet date word; the N ladder at genesis; the verification switch activation. +## Decisions ready for the project lead (added 6 October 2026, 23:1x UK) + +Two one-page verdicts landed after the close. Each is quoted verbatim from its file and each is **the project lead's decision owed**. The files sit on their branches and are not merged; read them there. + +### Emission: the tail + +`docs/analysis/tail-emission.md` on branch `tail-emission` (e1e28d2), ledger E22. The one page at the top of the file, 598 words: + +> **The problem.** Today's schedule pays miners USD 210,513 a day in year 1 at a flat USD 0.10, 6,877 in year 11, 427 in year 20, 13 in year 30. A 24-hour 51 percent rental costs 11.8 days of budget at any price and any hardware, so the attack costs USD 2.5 M in year 1, 81,106 in year 11, 5,042 in year 20, 158 in year 30. Year 20 pays 0.2 percent of year 1. +> +> **Not a fix.** Fees (USD 450 a day at launch, 4,195 in year 5, under 1 percent of it to a miner; Bitcoin's fee share is 0.69 percent), a four-year halving (the same cliff later), a treasury (emission with an owner). +> +> **The safe baseline.** A tail denominated in supply: p percent of scheduled supply a year for ever, from the first month the curve pays less. Security becomes a fixed share of market cap in every year: at p = 1 a 24-hour attack costs 0.032 percent of market cap, the 20-day veto 0.6 percent, at any price, no oracle. The holder gives **0.99 percent of their share a year** (9.5 percent over ten years), nothing else. No rent, no forced movement, no cost to inactivity. +> +> **The revolutionary candidates, tested.** A hash thermostat (E) beats its withholding game only with presence pay and reads hardware as money: a 10x efficiency jump halves its budget for two years. Settled-value targeting (F) needs 8.5 percent inflation at velocity 1 and a wash trader pins it to its ceiling for one base fee. Security as a product (H) is 1 percent of the subsidy in year 1; dormant-coin rent (G) is refused by ruling. The hybrid (I) holds under every modelled attack and adds nothing to the floor. +> +> **The supply question.** The coin count is cosmetic (18 decimals); the unit price is social. Kaspa and Dogecoin paid blocks in the hundreds of coins and drew miners. A solo 100 MH/s card on a 100 GH/s network earns 2,190 IGN a day today, 6,912 at 100 a block. A monthly glide loses 2.9 percent a month and halves nobody's income overnight. +> +> **Recommendation, one coherent emission, every field a genesis parameter:** 100 IGN a block at one block a second; a monthly glide with a two-year half-life (Kaspa's shape at half its pace); a 90-day ramp from 10 percent; a 1 percent tail from the month the glide first pays under 1 percent of supply (year 11.4). Supply: 8.64 billion at the switch, 9.5 billion in year 20, 11.6 billion in year 40. The budget never falls under 1 percent of supply, tested to year 200. +> +> **The public sentence** (replaces "4 billion, approached and never reached"): *Igneum has no hard cap. Emission starts at 100 IGN a block and falls 2.9 percent a month for ten years, then runs at 1 percent of supply a year for ever, every coin to the miners and provers who secure the chain. A holder's share falls 1 percent a year, and a 24-hour attack costs about twelve days of emission at any price, in any year.* +> +> **What moves.** The emission constants of `igneum.rs` become one parameter set, `EmissionSchedule::CURRENT` (section 5 names each); the testnet carries `TESTNET_1`. Coded on fork branch `tail-emission-node`; the devnet digest is pinned unchanged by test; the testnet digest moves. A genesis decision for `igneum-testnet-1`, nothing live touched. +> +> **Risks.** "No cap" is a sentence critics quote (E1 already concedes Monero's trade). The 1 percent is a judgement inside the peer range (Monero 0.85, Bitcoin 0.83, Ethereum about 0.5). Year 1 stays front-loaded (26 percent; 47 in two). + +### Vote or burn + +`docs/analysis/vote-or-burn.md` on branch `vote-weigh` (e816f28). The verdict, 498 words: + +> **Neither mechanism closes the line. Both price silence. Only the bonus passes the 95 percent test, and only at genesis.** +> +> 1. **Honest silence, measured.** 10.4 percent of the 83 staying keys' 45,176 key-checkpoints over 24 hours sat under participation 0.5; 79 percent of that is 15 fleet keys the Devnet 2 gate swapped off the live chain and back, mining nothing while away. The 19 always-on desktop keys dipped under 0.5 in 3.4 percent of checkpoints, longest dip 34 minutes, which on mainnet's 2-hour window never reaches 0.5. Tonight's 20 silent keys mined nothing while silent, so the burn would not have shortened the pause. +> +> 2. **History.** Every reward cut was fought and lost by the miners who stayed (Ethereum three times, Zcash three times, Ergo at 92 percent); where a cut removed a class's subsidy, the class left (Decred: two thirds of hash gone in a month). Offline penalties are accepted only as the reward forgone (Ethereum 0.625 against 0.844 earned; Cosmos 0.01 percent). No proof-of-work chain takes coins from a found block for a liveness fault. +> +> 3. **The 95 percent test.** Respect: 7-day hash at least 95 percent of the week before, no fork over 5 percent at 30 days, 95 percent of weight signing. Estimates: burn 70 to 80 percent (a 20 percent cut of a found block for an outage, without precedent, and for ever from `--no-vote` miners and pool members without a verifier). Bonus at genesis 93 to 97 percent (nobody loses what they had). Bonus by signal after launch 85 to 90 percent. A bonus from the proving pool: 97 percent, deters nothing. +> +> 4. **Security.** Weight is blue blocks (W2); an unpaid block is still weight, so a silent third keeps the veto under every mechanism. Base: the producer share. The burn prices a 34 percent set's silence at 6,206 IGN an hour (51-percent.md's 7,757 was 20 percent of the whole subsidy), the bonus at 3,103: USD 372 or 186 per 12-hour pause at USD 0.005; a deposit worth a double spend covers either. Weight-gated deep fork choice removes the prize; LEAVE ends tonight's class of pause. +> +> 5. **Recommendation.** No burn: `vote_burn_bps` stays never and leaves the tree before the testnet code is public. The bonus, `signing_bonus_bps` 1,000 (node tree ca3-v4-0316 10db4b61), on from the testnet genesis as the schedule, never by signal: silence = a voter of the table at the latest checkpoint in the block's past with no vote in the presence window (7,200 s, 240 indices); a young key and a key under dust read as present; the unsigned tenth to the proving pool. Gate before the switch leaves never: the replay test of section 5, then the owner's word. The miner's sentence: **"Igneum pays 80 percent of each block to its miner. 8 of those 80 points are for signing finality, which your miner does by itself every 30 seconds. Miss two hours of signing and your next blocks pay 72 until you sign again. Nothing is burned."** + +### Open questions, being implemented + +- The N ladder list (the era-draw ladder of the algorithm lane): being implemented; the one page's owed item is its values at genesis. +- 18 decimals: being implemented. + ## 2. The ranked list: top 25 across every lane Rank is payoff over cost across lanes, with safety first, then liveness, then money, then text. "L1 r3" means lane 1's own rank 3; the lane file holds the full evidence row.